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  • Year One of the Trump Administration's Policy:Uncertainty and Continuity
  • Walter Lohman (bio)

It seems like a distant memory now, but the first year of the Obama administration was an anxious one for many American Asia watchers. Those closest to the president, people who worked on his campaign, and people heartened by his boyhood connections to the region may have been confident about his professional interest in Asia. Those not in-the-know or disinclined to take too seriously the policy implications of his personal story were uncertain. The substance of President Obama's interest was also unclear. Asia policy was not a major theme of the campaign and he seemed ambivalent about its most important element — international trade.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to Asia on her first overseas trip as secretary. It was a very positive statement about American interests. During the course of the visit, however, what made the most news was a remark in reference to China that the United States had to be careful not to let human rights interfere with its broader interests. Later in the year, President Obama compounded doubts about his administration's priorities by refusing a customary meeting with the Dalai Lama. The best reading of his reluctance was that he would soon be visiting China for the first time and did not want to spoil the prospects for a productive visit; the worst was that, as his first National Security Strategy would later indicate, he saw China as a partner more than a challenge. And when President Obama made his own visit that November, it was plagued by doubt. Given his interaction with the Chinese, many critics were concerned that he had been manipulated.1 [End Page 43]

It was not until the Tokyo stop of this November swing through the region that President Obama committed the United States to joining negotiations on what would ultimately become central to his Asia policy — the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Until then, it was anything but certain whether he would endorse his predecessor's initiative. Similarly, until it was finalized in 2010, suspense surrounded the future of the U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), portions of which President Obama demanded be renegotiated as the price for his support.

The point of this recounting is not to evaluate the history of the previous administration but to contextualize the Trump administration's policy. The first year of a presidency is often an uncertain one. In 2009, few could have predicted that the "Asia Pivot" — much maligned by Beijing — would emerge as the framework for the administration's approach. The clues to the Trump administration's policy priorities may be cloudier than were Obama's at the end of 2009. Among other things, this is attributable to a very slow appointment process, the president's own haphazard messaging, and a remarkably hostile relationship with the press. Yet, at the end of 2017, the outlines of the Trump administration's Asia policy began to emerge, and they did not comport with many of the impressions coming out of the 2016 election. It is best characterized by a continuity with the past that will ensure a robust U.S. leadership into the future, albeit with one important caveat. On the economy, many policies were still pending at the end of 2017, but the signals pointed to an unorthodox approach that could derail the broader effort to maintain America's position in the region.

Expectations about relationships in Asia were dire following the election. Donald Trump's scepticism about America's relationship with China had been clear for many years. His campaign rhetoric only accentuated it. Fierce criticism of China is nothing new in American politics. Going back to the debate over "who lost China" in the 1950s, presidential candidates have often featured China negatively in their campaigns. What was striking about Trump's rhetoric in 2016 was not what he said about China, but the criticism directed at American allies in Japan and South Korea — which he portrayed as free riders on American largesse. Yet, in all three cases, the situation at the end of 2017 was much different than expected. The relationship with China...

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