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Ryle, the Double Counting Problem, and the Logical Form of Category Mistakes
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 56, Number 2, April 2018
- pp. 337-359
- 10.1353/hph.2018.0026
- Article
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abstract:
Gilbert Ryle is most famous for accusing the Cartesian dualist of committing a category mistake. Yet the nature of this accusation and the idea of a category mistake more generally remains woefully misunderstood. The aim of this paper is to rectify this misunderstanding. I show that Ryle does not conceive of category mistakes as mistakes of predication, as is widely believed. Instead, I show that category mistakes are mistakes of conjunction and quantification. This thesis uniquely unifies and explains the wide variety of Ryle’s remarks, judgments, and arguments.