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  • Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?
  • Derek Grossman (bio)
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Vietnam, Vietnamese Military, South China Sea


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executive summary

This article examines Vietnam’s warfighting capabilities for defending its disputed claims with China in the South China Sea.

main argument

Vietnam’s military modernization is increasingly focused on deterring China from seizing disputed territory in the South China Sea. By developing and fielding select capabilities—including Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2 maritime strike fighters, a network of anti-access missiles, and other weapon systems—Hanoi has likely achieved its core objective of convincing Beijing of the hardships it would face in a military conflict against Vietnam in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, if deterrence fails because Beijing believes it can mitigate the substantial but reasonable risks, then Vietnam is probably incapable of sustaining an extended, large-scale, or high-intensity conventional conflict in the region. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of its evolving warfighting doctrine in the air and sea domains, lack of jointness and unrealistic training activities, and shortcomings in the Vietnamese military’s maritime domain awareness capabilities and weapon systems interoperability.

policy implications

  • • U.S. policymakers should seek specific areas of cooperation and collaboration with Vietnam in the defense and military spheres that would enhance Hanoi’s warfighting capabilities. For example, the U.S. could pursue closer collaboration on coastal radar, satellite and other communications systems, maritime surveillance aircraft (including unarmed drones), and naval patrol craft.

  • • A dramatically reduced role for Washington in the Asia-Pacific would greatly increase the prospects of China employing bullying tactics against Vietnam. Hanoi could respond by accelerating and expanding its own military modernization efforts. Yet it is equally plausible that Hanoi would instead simply seek ways to accommodate Chinese demands, calculating that an arms race would be destabilizing and unwinnable. Neither scenario is in the strategic interests of the U.S. or Vietnam.

  • • Through sustained U.S. leadership in the region, the U.S. and Vietnam should deepen their burgeoning defense partnership to ensure that Hanoi stands a better chance in a significant military confrontation with China. [End Page 114]

A head of his participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, in November, China’s paramount leader, Xi Jinping, issued a statement entitled “For a New Vista in China-Vietnam Friendship.”1 In this statement, Xi lauded the “camaraderie and brotherhood” forged by China and Vietnam’s shared Communist revolutionary activities, and he praised their history of “good neighborliness.” These factors, he argued, should enable Beijing and Hanoi to find a “fundamental and durable solution” to the most pressing bilateral dispute—their substantial overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. By the end of his visit, Xi and the Vietnamese general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, agreed to manage tensions in the region.2

Despite Xi’s optimistic message and the positive outcome, Vietnamese leaders are increasingly concerned that China’s actions in the region are destabilizing and meant to alter the status quo. Beijing, for instance, could eventually leverage its expanding military footprint in the South China Sea—which now includes naval and air patrols as well as upgraded military facilities with runways sitting atop reclaimed land features under de facto Chinese control—to seize additional features that are currently under Vietnam’s control. Additionally, China has been attempting to administer substantial portions of the South China Sea with the China Coast Guard frequently patrolling these waters, making them off-limits to Vietnamese fishermen even when they fall within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Vietnam has approximately one million fishermen and 120,000 fishing boats throughout the country’s EEZ, and its leaders have emphasized linkages between coastal economic development and the ability to access and exploit resources in the South China Sea. In other words, the South China Sea is Vietnam’s economic lifeline, with significant implications for the country’s sovereignty, security, and domestic and political stability.

In the event that China and Vietnam are unable to peacefully resolve their differences in the region, what are the prospects that the Vietnam People’s...

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