Thailand's Hyper-Royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament by Thongchai Winichakul (review)

It is difficult to remember that not long ago, scholars rarely gave much attention to the Thai monarchy. If they did, their view of the monarchy was mostly positive. While naturally a conservative institution, the monarchy appeared to be generally and genuinely popular. It seemed to provide unity and a sense of national identity in an era of rapid economic and social change and seemingly rampant Westernization. King Bhumibol himself appeared dedicated, modest, a pious Buddhist, who could play a crucial conciliatory role at moments of national crisis. Some even credited the king with having contributed to Thailand's process of democratization. For international scholars and media commentators, it was not too much of a stretch to view Thailand's monarchy as akin to the constitutional monarchies of Europe.

This all changed with the beginning of the political crisis in late 2005, which continues to plague Thailand's political scene today. The monarchy has become intensely politicized. In retrospect, the earlier unproblematic view of the monarchy appears to have been the product of a sophisticated, successful, and long-lasting programme of state propaganda. The 'consent'—in the Gramscian sense—surrounding the place of the monarchy in Thai society, both among the Thai public and the international scholarly community, has now broken down. The great divide in contemporary Thai politics between the 'Yellows' and the 'Reds' has centred on how one views the monarchy.

As a result, despite the severe restriction on public discussion of the monarchy there has been a flood of publications on all aspects of the institution, mostly critical (a small sample of some of the more influential works would include McCargo 2005; Handley 2006; Phorphant 2008; Ivarsson and Isager 2010; Streckfuss 2011; Marshall 2014; Ferraro 2015; Unaldi 2016; Jory 2016). Exiled Thai academics Somsak Jeamteerasakul and Pavin Chachavalpongpun excoriate the monarchy almost daily in posts written in Thai on Facebook, each read by huge numbers of people: Somsak has over 300,000 followers while Pavin has over 125,000—more than some newspapers. Some exiled Red Shirt activists and academics give lectures via YouTube calling for a Thai republic. Coverage of the monarchy in prestigious international media like The Economist and The Wall Street Journal also tends to be critical. Since the accession to the throne of King Vajiralongkorn the international media reporting on Thailand's monarchy has become even more unfavourable. It can no longer be said that there is no critical literature on the Thai monarchy. Indeed, one might wonder what more could be written about the monarchy that scholars do not already know.

In a recent (2016) essay for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies' 'Trends in Southeast Asia' series Thongchai Winichakul attempts to contribute to this literature by proposing a new concept, 'hyper-royalism', as a way of explaining the sharp rise in royalist propaganda in recent years. His essay defines this concept, traces its origins to the 1960s, and attempts to explain its intensification during the 1980s, before it built to a crescendo in the 2000s. The essay briefly considers whether, with the passing of King Bhumibol (the essay was published before the king's death in October 2016), such 'hyper-royalism' can continue under his successor, King Vajiralongkorn.

Thongchai defines 'hyper-royalism' as a 'cultural and ideological condition' (p. 3) characterized by 'intense, excessive royalism'. He recounts the now familiar history of the modern history of the monarchy, from the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, its nadir during the People's Party era, its recovery beginning from the 1947 coup, its return to the centre of Thai politics under the Sarit military dictatorship, its role in the tumultuous politics of the 1970s, the emergence of 'royalist guided democracy' from 1976–2010 (p. 5). He notes the revival of royal ritual, the resacralization of the monarchy (pp. 9–10; 20–25), the participation of the private sector, educational institutions, the healthcare sector, the arts...