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128 Shorter Book Reviews were many features of the Fascist movement which indicated its deviance from the so-called right-wing ideologies. Moreover, Schmitz's view of the early aims of Fascism is inaccurate. in spite of their ideology, the Fascists in power were not necessarily aiming at establishing a dictatorial state in Italy. This is a process which took shape only in the aftermath of Giacomo Matteotti's murder in 1924. It is fair to say that these are issues of Italian and European history, not of American history, but a more sophisticated understanding of them would have enabled Schmitz to place American foreign policy in its proper focus. In spite of these criticisms, I feel that Schmitz's work makes interesting reading and clearly restates some crucial aspects of American foreign policy--that the American experience in Italy set the stage for U.S. relationships with future right-wing and Fascist regimes throughout the world and that, at least in regard to Europe, the eventual U.S. opposition to Fascism was not a matter of ideological conflict. Antonio Santosuosso Department of History University of Western Ontario William M. Leary, ed. We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942-1945. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988. xi + 305pp. Illus. This collection of eight essays on General Douglas MacArthur and his subordinate commanders in the Southwest Pacific campaign provides valuable insights into the nature of leadership, the craft of high command, the conduct of war against Japan and the talent of MacArthur himself. Although some of the generals and admirals who served MacArthur did write memoirs or were the subjects of biographies, this book sets out to highlight their contribution to victory in New Guinea and the Philippines. The book begins with an essay by Stanley L. Falk on "Douglas MacArthur and the War Against Japan" which concisely summarizes Mac.Arthur's views on the war in the Southwest Pacific and neatly sets the background for papers on his individual commanders. D.M. Horner writes on "Blarney and MacArthur: Problem of Coalition Warfare"; William M. Leary follows with "Walter Krueger: MacArthur's Fighting General"; Herman S. Wolk investigates "George C. Kenney: MacArthur's Premier Airman"; Gerald E. Wheeler looks at "Thomas C. Kinkaid: MacArthur's Master of Naval Warfare"; Jay Luvaas and John F. Shortal analyze the contribution of "Robert L. Eichelberger: MacArthur's Fireman"; Donald M. Shorter Book Reviews 129 Goldstein studies "Ernis C. Whitehead: Aerial Tactician"; and, lastly, Paolo E. Coletta describes the work of "Daniel E. Barbey: Amphibious Warfare Expert." As virtually all of the above were on bad terms with MacArthur's abrasive Chief of Staff, Richard K. Sutherland, it is a pity that a paper on Sutherland could not have been included in this collection, for it would have helped to clarify the influence of the commanders on decision-making at MacArthur's headquarters. Homer's excellent portrayal of Sir Thomas Blarney, the Australian general, and on his relationship with MacArthur, is especially interesting because it vividly shows the difficulties which this fine and very experienced soldier encountered, not only with MacArthur, who deliberately attempted to minimize his role as commander of Allied land forces, but also with the Australian Prime Minister, who always agreed with MacArthur. Leary's article on Walter Krueger, who commanded the Sixth Army, portrays a methodical and painstaking soldier whose concern for the welfare of his troops was exemplary but whose generalship was uninspired. In sharp contrast to Krueger, Robert L. Eichelberger is shown by Luvaas and Shortal to be a general who possessed real flair and immense talent. Yet because he attracted press attention in the early stages of the New Guinea campaign, MacArthur deliberately relegated him to training troops in Australia until the final phase of the war in the Philippines. Wolk, writing on George C. Kenney, and Wheeler, dealing with Thomas C.Kinkaid, show both the airman and the admiral to be competent and thorough-going officers. Yet there were tensions among the generals and admirals. Coletta notes that Kinkaid described his junior, Daniel C. Barbey, as being "a little too ambitious." Goldstein leaves the impression that Ennis C. Whitehead resented Kenney's...

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