Abstract

Abstract:

I suggest that John Dewey's approach to the problem of consciousness is both methodologically and metaphysically superior to those found in contemporary debates. Dewey advances a picture of consciousness that avoids the mistakes present in the three major tendencies in contemporary philosophy of consciousness, namely, David J. Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and Daniel C. Dennett's A Priori Physicalism. I argue that Dewey's philosophy of consciousness shows that Naturalistic Dualism is wrong, that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy could be better, and thar A Priori Physicalism goes too far.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1558-9587
Print ISSN
0009-1774
Pages
pp. 466-490
Launched on MUSE
2017-12-28
Open Access
No
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