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  • Slaughter at the Chapel: The Battle of Ezra Church, 1864 by Gary Ecelbarger
  • Matthew A. Byron
Slaughter at the Chapel: The Battle of Ezra Church, 1864. By Gary Ecelbarger. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016. Pp. x, 275. $26.95, ISBN 978-0-8061-5499-2.)

Published in the wake of Earl J. Hess's The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta (Chapel Hill, 2015), Slaughter at the Chapel: The Battle of Ezra Church, 1864 is a thoroughly detailed military history of the battle of Ezra Church. Until recently, the battle was overlooked within the larger Atlanta campaign of 1864. As Gary Ecelbarger acknowledges, the limited number of sources have led scholars to rely heavily on the official war record of the Union army and the incomplete records of a few Confederate commanders and soldiers. Despite these limited sources, Ecelbarger masterfully traces the movements of both Union and Confederate forces throughout the day of July 28, 1864. In doing so, he argues that Ezra Church proved to be the pivotal battle in General William Tecumseh Sherman's capture of Atlanta and, more significant, in the destruction of Confederate morale within the Army of Tennessee under General John B. Hood.

Although Slaughter at the Chapel provides very little in the way of new documented evidence, it does offer a new perspective based on a "campaign-experienced" interpretation of the movements of both Union and Confederate forces (p. 6). Through this analysis, Ecelbarger challenges the traditional stance that General Stephen D. Lee's delayed attack on July 28 was responsible for the Confederate failures at Ezra Church. According to the author, scholars have unfairly criticized Lee's actions during the battle, as the blame rests more with Hood's unexplainable delay in issuing marching orders and General Alexander P. Stewart's decision to attack along the same path as Lee's two earlier failed attempts. To this extent, Ecelbarger is perplexed at Hood's actions during the battle, whereby the general never left his headquarters to survey the evolving battlefield.

Unfortunately, one aspect of Ecelbarger's argument hinges on an assumption that cannot be definitively proved. According to the author, had General Hood issued moving orders to General Lee earlier on July 28, Lee may have secured the high ground at Ezra Church and held off the Union attacks. Although it is likely that Lee would have reached the heights first, there is no conclusive evidence that his forces were adequate to repel Union troops.

Despite his unsubstantiated claim regarding Lee's chances of winning at Ezra Church, Ecelbarger makes a compelling argument that Union and Confederate officers' decisions largely determined the outcome of the battle of Ezra Church. In the process, the author dismisses previous arguments regarding why the Confederates lost, including claims that Confederate desertion was a major contributor to Lee's failed attacks and that the use of repeating rifles by Union forces accounted for the large disparity in total casualties. Ecelbarger successfully shows that the cooperative efforts of Union leadership, in contrast to the disjointed communications between Confederate officers, resulted in a Union victory. [End Page 989]

Matthew A. Byron
Young Harris College
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