Abstract

I propose to downgrade the Liar paradox from what Quine called an antinomy to a much weaker veridical paradox. I then apply Quine's strategy of rejecting veridical paradoxes by exposing an unacceptable premise to the Liar. I argue that upon analysis the intension of a standard Liar sentence presupposes the existence of a non-empty empty set; and that since such an object is impossible this presupposition may be rejected, downgrading the Liar. I then briefly argue that Dialetheism can be motivated without supposing the existence of a non-empty empty set.

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Additional Information

ISSN
2154-154X
Print ISSN
0276-2080
Pages
pp. 21-32
Launched on MUSE
2017-10-18
Open Access
No
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