The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin's Foreign Policy, 1945–1953 by Peter Ruggenthaler (review)

This comprehensively researched book explores the Soviet Union's policy toward Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway from 1945 until the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953. In confronting this ambitious task, Peter Ruggenthaler seeks to answer a basic question: "What did neutrality look like when seen from Moscow in the early stage of the Cold War" (p. xx). He argues that Stalin viewed neutrality as a foreign policy instrument or "propaganda tool." To demonstrate this point across several countries, Ruggenthaler highlights "the plans, strategies, tactical considerations and goals of the Soviet Central East European and East European policies on the basis of the most up-to-date state of research" (p. xvi). Covering all of this in a single volume would be nearly impossible, and Ruggenthaler therefore offers the caveat that he will not be presenting "theoretical disquisitions" on "neutrality," "neutralization," and "nonalignment" (p. xix). The resulting fast-paced, dense, insightful narrative, which is minimal on context and rich on well-documented facts and events, provides ample evidence to corroborate Ruggenthaler's premise.

The book is based on exhaustive mining of important Russian archives. Through in-depth archival research at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and less-thorough study, owing to access restrictions, at the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Ruggenthaler elucidates Stalin's "'real' thinking and motives" and takes us "behind the scenes of the decision making process at the top level in Moscow" (p. 367). Consequently, one of the book's major academic strengths is its painstakingly organized treasure trove of documentary evidence, which will have lasting and undeniable value for historians of the period. The meticulously presented references, which constitute almost a third of the book, will stand the test of time, and their scholarly utility as a starting point for further research on the topic goes well beyond the scope of the tightly woven narrative.

The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the period from 1945 until the watershed year of 1949, which plays a crucial part in the narrative by marking, on the one hand, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The second portion covers the final few years of Stalin's life.

The story moves from Central Europe to the Nordic countries, involving a long list of actors, ranging from the Austrian Communist Party Secretary General Johann Koplenig and Austrian Chancellor Karl Renner in Austria; through President Wilhelm Pieck and Socialist Unity Party General Secretary Walter Ulbricht in the German Democratic Republic (GDR); to President Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen in Finland. Ruggenthaler scrutinizes their actions from the perspective of the Soviet Union's interest in Europe's postwar division into spheres of influence between the newly formed Western and Eastern camps, led by Washington and Moscow respectively. In Central and Northern Europe, numerous presidents, prime ministers, and Communist party leaders come and go, whereas in Moscow, Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, and later Andrei Vyshinskii are the enduring protagonists, providing the compositional adhesive for this wide-ranging account. In Ruggenthaler's story, Stalin and to a lesser extent his closest foreign policy aides were great schemers who used manipulative diplomatic maneuvers to further their objectives. Ruggenthaler's thematically driven narrative precludes an in-depth discussion of the local environment, but he provides the quintessential ingredients needed for understanding the motivations behind the Soviet leader's diplomatic overtures. However, those expecting a gripping tale must be prepared for a rather taxing exposition that demands the reader's utmost attention to the unifying theme; namely, the Soviet regime's use and abuse of neutrality as a foreign policy tool in the emerging bipolar...