Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ: Agency, Necessity, and Culpability in Augustinian Theology by Jesse Couenhoven (review)

Reinhold Niebuhr famously considered original sin "the only empirically verifiable doctrine of the Christian faith." And Karl Barth once asked, "Is it not the Doctrine which, in the last resort, underlies the whole teaching of history? Is it possible to adopt 'a different point of view' from that of the Bible, Augustine, and the Reformers?" Couenhoven answers Barth's query with a fitting "yes and no" in this tightly argued and wide-ranging work as it interweaves historical and moral theology with analytic philosophy, personality psychology, and social ethics.

It might seem that the doctrine of original sin has lapsed or fallen on hard times, and perhaps rightly so. It sits in uneasy tension with much that we have come to hold dear. For many of us, the idea that we are blameworthy for an inherited sinful state that we had no opportunity to avoid and no role in bringing about remains far from intuitive. And yet, it is precisely this uneasy proposal that Couenhoven affirms: "I hope to convince my readers that the doctrine of original sin's perceived weaknesses—the scandalous suggestion that we can be culpable for involuntary and inherited evils and a weakening of the distinction between individual and social sin—are actually its greatest insights" (8). Critically assessing the doctrinal commitments that comprise Augustine's account, and arguing that it is not only plausible but salutary for reassessing individual responsibility and for redressing social ills, Couenhoven's rehabilitation of the much-maligned doctrine aims to make us more fair, merciful, and humane in our treatment of one another amid the manifold vulnerabilities of our human condition.

Part 1 assesses the account of original sin handed down in Augustine's mature anti-Pelagian works. Couenhoven ably dissects the doctrine, identifying five distinct features—primal sin, human solidarity with Adam, inherited sin, sin's penalty, and sin's transmission—to disaggregate the more objectionable aspects from those elements that warrant a more appreciative reception. Couenhoven argues convincingly that inherited sin, as "original sin itself," constitutes the "conceptual heart of the doctrine" (23). He probes why inherited sin seemed plausible to Augustine—how it would have offered explanatory power in light of increasingly prevalent ecclesial practices of infant baptism as well as the ways it mirrors Augustine's account of divine grace and comports with his reading of biblical texts (e.g., Rom 5:12, 7:24, 1 Cor 15:22).

Part 2 advances a constructive account of original sin and explores a range of issues from legal punishment to psychological disease, coercion, and character formation. Couenhoven again disaggregates overlapping concepts often conflated in contemporary ethics: choice, freedom, responsibility, culpability, and punishment. The argument highlights important differences between libertarian freedom in which "choice" is essential and "Augustinian compatibilism" in which freedom is instead construed normatively as a love for goodness. By the conclusion, Couenhoven has argued "that Augustine's sexism is a prime example of an involuntary sin" and that like our own sinfulness, it was "inherited as a given from his society" (207). We retain responsibility and culpability for sexist beliefs, desires, and (in)action even if we cannot avoid inheriting these attributes.

Couenhoven's book offers a cornucopia of gifts to all who labor in the expansive field of Christian ethics. It presents the culmination of a productive decade of interdisciplinary research into enduring concerns of moral inquiry. Its implications and applications are far-reaching, from atonement and forgiveness to criminal justice and reparations. If it were merely a work in Augustinian studies, it would be exemplary for combining equal parts historical, constructive, and moral theology. As a study of moral agency, it will repay careful reading by those whose labors transgress the boundaries between theological and philosophical pastures.