Abstract

I argue that intentionalist theories of meaning and interpretation, like those of Hirsch and Juhl, have been insufficiently attentive to the different levels of authorial intention that are operative in literary works. By countenancing intentions on different levels—ranging from simple semantic intentions, over the use of irony and allusion, to wideranging strategic decisions or attempts to express general ideas—and their complex interplay, intentionalism converges, at least in practice, on some of the rival approaches to interpretation. This paper provides a rationale for, and a sketch of, a multilevel intentionalism that is more sensitive to authorial and critical practice.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-329X
Print ISSN
0190-0013
Pages
pp. 70-90
Launched on MUSE
2017-07-05
Open Access
No
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