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  • Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American Civil War by Andrew S. Bledsoe
  • Lorien Foote
Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American Civil War. Andrew S. Bledsoe. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-0-8071-6070-1, 352pp., cloth, $47.50.

Historical and sociological studies of soldier motivation in wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries agree that the leadership of junior officers plays a significant role in the willingness of soldiers to fight and in their performance in battle. Although studies of Civil War soldiers abound, until now there has been no monograph that focuses exclusively on that conflict’s junior officer corps. Andrew Bledsoe’s Citizen-Officers provides a much-needed examination of the men who were the “sinews and tendons” of Civil War armies (71). Although most of his conclusions will not surprise scholars who are well versed in the sources and literature on soldiers and armies, no other book better captures the challenges of command during the Civil War and the transformation of volunteers into a cadre of effective officers.

Volunteer officers, like the soldiers they commanded, were immersed in a republican citizen-soldier ethos that was not necessarily compatible with the demands of military service. They believed in voluntary consent, moral excellence and self-control, egalitarianism, and that ability rather than status should determine who rose through the military ranks. Thus they often struggled with the tension between their own beliefs and the need to establish authority and discipline. The majority of junior officers commissioned before 1864 became officers through election. Although this process created problems, it also ensured that officers were men who possessed the leadership abilities necessary to win the approval of a majority of their men. Bledsoe’s research sample indicates that officers were older than enlisted men, mostly unmarried, practiced a trade or profession, and were from middle-to upper-class backgrounds. [End Page 68]

In his best chapter, “The Challenges of Company Leadership,” Bledsoe considers how these elected, untrained, and inexperienced citizen officers legitimized their authority and established command over the independent-minded citizen soldiers who continually tested the boundaries of army discipline. Through trial and error, natural ability, creativity, and observation, they learned the skills they needed. They had to master many roles: caretaker, motivator, disciplinarian, teacher, counselor, conflict resolver, and bureaucrat. They had to be carefully attuned to the physical and emotional needs of their soldiers. But most importantly, they had to internalize a “habit of command” and compartmentalize their instincts toward egalitarianism. A “command presence,” combined with the powerful interpersonal relationships and deep connections that officers developed with their men, was key to successful leadership in battle. Officers needed to win the trust of their men, and Bledsoe argues that for this purpose displays of “competence” on and off the battlefield were more important than displays of courage.

Over time, volunteer officers “developed a unique interior culture” that blended examples they took from the regular army officer corps with their persistent citizen soldier ethos (102). Bledsoe describes a process of “regularization” rather than professionalization through which officers consciously adhered to a modified version of the standards, customs, and systems of the regular army. Gentlemanlike behavior that encompassed self-restraint, virtue, and courtesy, among others, was essential to this culture.

Bledsoe concludes his study by considering volunteer officers in combat. Early battles were initiations that provided the essential foundation for the future. By 1863, officers had learned that discipline in battle was more needed than personal bravery and that effective leaders were constantly aware of the condition, needs, and fighting effectiveness of their men. Their most important role in battle, Bledsoe argues, was emotional. They were the “moral center of gravity” for the volunteers in their company during the stress and terror of battle. They calmly translated the surrounding chaos into a set of problems and actions the men could understand and perform. As volunteer soldiers became veterans, officers were less occupied with custodial roles and were able to turn their focus and energies toward battlefield circumstances and tactical factors.

Three years of combat changed the composition of the officer corps...

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