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  • Fichte’s Ethical Thought by Allen W. Wood
  • Caroline A. Buchanan and Daniel Breazeale
Allen W. Wood. Fichte’s Ethical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 352. Cloth, $60.00.

Fichte’s Ethical Thought follows a format familiar to those who have read Allen Wood’s books on the ethical thought of Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel: Wood integrates Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s work into topical chapters, each discussing an important component of Fichte’s ethical system. The text he focuses on, of course, is Fichte’s 1798 System of Ethics, but Fichte scholars will likely be pleased to find that Wood discusses a wide range of Fichte’s [End Page 170] Jena-era writings. Wood makes use of Addresses to the German Nation, The Closed Commercial State, and earlier works such as Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, especially in the final two chapters, which cover Fichte’s thought on public life, the human vocation, and the role of society and the state. We hope that the inclusion of these texts is indicative of a trend in Fichte scholarship, as they represent rich opportunities for further study.

This book will be of particular service to those seeking an accessible introduction to Fichte, and not only to his ethics. Wood is comprehensive in his discussion of Fichte’s historical context, even including an initial biographical chapter detailing the philosophical forces at play during Fichte’s Jena years. Chapter 2 covers Fichte’s transcendental system in general, and provides an impressively thorough theoretical backdrop. Wood begins the chapter by establishing why it is a mistake to label Fichte a subjective idealist, and then briefly discusses the nature of transcendental “necessity” (30–36). Included are discussions of Fichte’s moral justification for rejecting dogmatism (37–43), and his endorsement of “intellectual intuition,” which Kant famously denies (55–59). Wood discusses Fichte’s early adherence to a “first principle” with notable nuance (46–51); he rejects both foundationalist and coherentist interpretations of Fichte’s system. Included here is a brief description of his own approach, although those familiar with this issue will find only enough detail to pique their interest.

Chapter 3 is devoted to “Freedom and Intersubjectivity,” and includes a particularly thoughtful discussion of both topics, especially Fichte’s idea of the “summons” from The Foundations of Natural Right, which famously influenced Hegel’s account of intersubjectivity.

Chapters 4–6—roughly half of the book—cover Fichte’s actual ethical system. Chapter 4 is a discussion of the nature of the Fichtean self and the origin of moral authority in this self. In chapter 5, Wood turns to Fichte’s conception of conscience. Current literature is given special attention here, as he enters fully into an ongoing scholarly dialogue about how to interpret the concept and whether it is philosophically coherent. In this chapter, Wood moves temporarily away from his wide audience to address Fichte scholars directly. His conversation is technical and geared toward those who are familiar with the wealth of recent literature on the topic. Those with such familiarity will find Wood’s defense of Fichte’s conception of conscience noteworthy. Fichtean conscience can appear so subjective as to be unassailable, and so fanatical as to be deaf to reason. But Wood claims this is due to a misreading. His interpretive effort rests on “drawing a distinction between moral judgment and conviction (or certainty)” (159).

This distinction suggests that while theoretical reason produces moral judgments, its conclusions may be forever open to dispute. Conscience, on the other hand, is a product of our need to act in the world, and it provides infallible conviction insofar as it dictates to us a practical commitment rather than a theoretical one. It is an “infallible criterion for the correctness of the judgment that this is what I ought to do” (162) at this moment, given my present options. Wood’s work here is only a sketch of how this distinction impacts his own interpretation of Fichtean conscience. A more fully detailed account would have been most welcome, enabling specialist readers to see more clearly how Wood’s interpretation fits into the current scholarly conversation. However, given the...

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