The Theory of Democracy—Part IV—The Principles of Justice: Constitutionality

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY PART IV THE PRINCIPLES oF JusTICE: CoNsTITUTIONALITY PURSUING our original plan, we shall now undertake, in this part and Part V, to demonstrate the proposition that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government . We have distinguished between the demonstrability of this thesis and its demonstration, between its intelligibility and its truth.276 We have shown that a moral hierarchy of political forms is conceivable; it remains to demonstrate that moral hierarchy and to show that actual conditions in the historic order of political events verify its existence.277 The demonstrability of the thesis was validated in Parts II and III, wherein it was shown how a diversity of existential common goods might specify morally unequal forms of government , subordinate to the generic moral distinction between all good and all bad forms, which must be made in terms of the ideal common good. Therein also it was shown that natural happiness, properly defined, is the ultimate end, distinct from the common good, which can be served more and less effectively by more and less just political institutions. We shall, therefore, begin this section by stating the objection which remains to be answered, analyzing its significance, and defining the issue which it generates.278 1. The objection does not deny that some distinction can be made among types of good government. On the contrary, the objection affirms the traditional belief that there are three pure types (monarchy, aristocracy, and polity) and several mixed regimes. But it insists that these political institutions are all ••• Vd. Part III, in THE THoMIST, IV, I, p. U4, and IV, !l, pp. 884-85. •n Vd. Part II, in THE THOMIST, III, 4, p. 595. 218 Vd. Part I, in THE THoMisT, III, 8, pp. 428-!l9; and esp. pp. 480-91, where the objection now to be considered was first mentioned. 446 THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 447 equally just. If one is judged better than another, either absolutely or relative to particular circumstances, such judgment expresses an ordering only in terms of utility, not gradations of justice. The better is simply a more efficient means to the common good, the social welfare, the well-being of the state itself, its enduring unity of peace. The elements of justice which make any type of government morally good are equally present in all good states. One good government differs from another only in the degree of efficiency with which ·it maintains the political community. It is morally indifferent whether a people choose this or that type of good government. The position which we hold sharply contrasts with the traditional position taken by the objector. We think that genuine political progress is possible and has occurred-that, in the course of history, mankind has moved from less just to more just forms of political organization. The progress has been slow; much remains to be achieved; and at every stage of development , there have been political atavisms and regressions. The processes of political corruption are also " progressive " in the sense that the several perversions of good government are not all equally bad. A people can suffer less or greater injustice at the hands of those who degrade their institutions. Such progressive change in either direction would be impossible if the several types of good government were morally indifferent. History might then record transitions from less to more efficient governments serving the common good, or from less to more efficient ways of exploiting the community and alienating its good to those who exercise power for their own benefit. But that is all. We insist, however, that the facts of history show that that is not all. The weight of their evidence alone would suffice to refute the objection. But, of course, the facts of history must be interpreted, and so the issue cannot be resolved merely by going to the historical record. It :i.s constituted by opposing theories, and it must be argued accordingly. The issue is made by one major contention on our part, namely, that there are both generic and specific moral distinc- 448 M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL tions among forms of government, that all the good forms of...