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THE MORALITY OF IMPERFECTIONS I. THE QuESTION SURVEY of our modern manuals of moral theology reveals a curious fact about their teaching on moral imperfections. The fact is that their explanations are generally inconsistent. Briefly, they amount to this: A positive moral imperfection is not a sin but it displeases God.1 The solitary exception to this manner of solving the problem is to be found in the later editions of Vermeersch.2 This open departure from the beaten path of moralists on the part of Vermeersch warrants an investigation. The whole question concerning moral imperfections resolves itself to this: Must there be granted, between full-fledged sin and morally perfect action, the existence of another, third type of moral act differing from both of the above-mentioned types and meriting in all theological rigor the title, "positive moral imperfection," which the authors generally reserve for it? The authors conceive of a moral imperfection, not· as a positive privation of perfection due to morals which would certainly involve sin, and not as a pure negation of perfection in no way due to morals which would imply material defects lying beyond the sphere of formal morality, but rather as a third sort of imperfection lacking a certain plenitude or superabundance of perfection which it might have realized and which we normally expect to find realized in virtuous men. This imperfection is sometimes identified with the deliberate choice 1 Noldin, S. J., Theol. Mor., I, n. 289 (fl2a Edit., 1934, Oeniponte): "... per se non sunt peccata attamen displicent Deo . . ." Cf. also, Genicot, S. J., Theol. Mor. (Genicot-Salsmans), I, n. 149, n. 316; Slater, S. J., Theol. Mor., I, p. Sfl (6th Edit., New York, l9fl8); Lehmkuhl, S. J., Theoi. Mor., I, n. 109; H, n. 360 (lla Edit., Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1910); Aertnys-Damen, Theol. Mor., I, n. 233 bis (Edit., 1932). • Vermeersch, S. J., Theol. Mor., I, n. 440 (Edit., 1934): "... putamus deiiberatam omissionem boni melioris ab aliqua culpa vacare non potest." 388 THE MORALITY OF IMPERFECTIONS 389 of a morally inferior good and sometimes with a mere omission, the omission of a better good, of a divine inspiration or counsel of perfection. But our moralists hasten to distinguish between the abstract and concrete state of moral goods. The better good, accepted in the abstract, is not always the individual's better good considered here and now as surrounded by concrete circumstances. The authors, therefore, wish to confine their moral imperfection to the concrete order of things, consequently to a choice of the lesser good or to an omission of the greater good considered in ~he concrete. Not every choice of the lesser good or omission of the counsels, even when envisaged in the concrete, measures up to the demands of our problem, for the authors insist upon the full title, " positive moral imperfection." To fully realize this final condition of "positive " moral imperfection a concrete choice or omission must have fallen upon matter against which we are positively urged or invited. It must be a concrete choice of the lesser good in the face of a positive impulse or inclination towards the better good also accepted concretely. It :must be brought to the attention of a certain individual, not merely that this particular alternative seems undoubtedly to be the better good for him here and now in these surroundings, but what is more, that he has a special attraction for this alternative in the sense that his own reason seems to counsel this choice in preference to the other alternative. He must be aware that this might be some movement of grace prompting him or an inspiration of the Holy Ghost persuading him to accept this better good. Hence the positive moral imperfection may be described as an omission of the better good or a work of counsel in the face of one's own reason urging the opposite, in the face of a divine inspiration inviting the contrary. Does such an action, formally and concretely accepted, fall under the category of sin or under that of deeds meritorious and good, though less good than one might reasonably expect? There is the problem as it stands in the manuals of...

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