The Intellectual Virtue of Prudence

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York City VoL. VIII OCTOBER, 1945 No.4 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE T HERE is within the human· a principle of activity whose end is reached only when he has acquired in a distinctive manner a knowledge of things, when by an act of its own it has caused to exist within himself the external object. This existence of the external object under a new mode of existence-an intentional existence-is knowledge. Knowledge, then, is the end of the intellect. But knowledge is a great antiphony: to understand it we must constantly refer to now this member, now that, between which there is a constant interplay of activity constituting knowledge. The perfection of knowledge exists only in one term of this transcendental relation, and as far as the other term-the object-is concerned, knowledge is only an extrinsic affection; yet knowledge is wholly determined in kind by the object. Since knowledge is determined by the object, since it is the intentional existence of the form of the object, we must expect in lmowledge that same stratification, that same irreducible 413 414 WILLIAM A. GERHARD difference in kind that we find in extramental being. Knowledge will not be a solid, homogeneous mass of ideas all of the same nature and all having the same end. As in the world we find men of action and men of contemplation, so in the knowledge which specifies these men we will find a radical difference. And as within these two general groups of humans we find many shades of difference, so too in the knowledge possessed by each class within these groups we will find kllowledge shading off into many differences. But always we must look to the object for the raison d'etre of these differences in knowledge (and activity of this knowledge). In the order of knowledge we must submit entirely to the object, we. must lose ourselves to it to save ourselves. The first and one of the most striking and irreducible differences in knowledge is that some kinds of knowledge are completed and perfected by the very· act of knowing, while other types of knowledge are of such a nature that they are truncated if not put into operation.1 The former we shall call the product of the speculative in,tellect, and the latter that of the practical intellect. These are not two separate intellects, but two manifestations of the power of the same intellect. The answer to this mystery is to be found in a consideration of the object-the ultimate arbiter in all questions of knowledge. We call the practical and speculative intellect two manifestations of the power of the intellect rather than two potencies because for a formal difference of potencies there must be a 1 St. Thomas, In Boetium De Trinitate, q. V, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus, in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat ad operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo dicit Philosophus 3 De Anima, quod differunt ad invicem fine; et in 2 Meta., dicitur, quod finis speculativae est veritas, finis operativae sive practicae actio. Cum igitur oporteat materiam fini esse proportionatam, oportet practicarum scientiarum materiam esse res illas quae a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut earum cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit. Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non fiunt; unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non potest sicut in finem: et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui." THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 415 formal difference in the aspects under which they consider the object; for instance, the natural philosopher differs in his knowledge formally from the physicist because the former considers ens in quantum mobile seu sensibile while the latter considers ens in quantum mensurabile. We have here not two distinct intellectual powers, but the same kind of potency exercising its function under two different modalities which, while specifically distinct, are not generically different. The...