The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom: [Conclusion—The Criticism]

THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM [Conclusion - The Criticism] III. CRITICISM OF THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND I. POTENCY AND ACT IN THE ORDER OF BEING 1. The Metaphysical Order. Having seen the teaching of Suarez on human· freedom and on potency.and act, we are ready now to begin our analysis and criticism of that teaching. Since our purpose in considering potency and act is only to determine whether it throws further light on Suarez' notions on human freedom, it is clearly reasonable that we should begin our criticism by considering the teaching on potency and act; then, later, we shall see how those teachings enter into the Suarezian treatment of freedom. The essential thing to be grasped about Suarez' whole treatment of potency and act is its remarkable unity. We have already indicated that the entire treatment can be unified in the principle that a simple reality can of itself be both actual and its own intnnsic limitation of act; conversely, the potential can somehow contain its own act. Is that principle, which obviously has vast implications for the order of operation, and, therefore, for free human acts, truly to be found in Suarez' discussion of (1) potency and act in the order of created being, both metaphysical and (composed) physical and (2) potency and act in the order of operation? Our task here is to reexamine the teachings of Suarez and determine the fact. We shall consider first his discussion of essence and existence, potency and act in the metaphysical order of being. 1. Potency and Act in the MetaphY8ical Order. At the 155 156 THOMAS U. MULLANEY beginning of this discussion 415 Suarez assigns as the foundation for real identity of essence and existence the principle that nothing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself. The very fact of distinction argues that each is independent of the other. Later Suarez repeats essentially the same proposition, saying that nothing can be constituted in its very entity through something distinct from itself.416 The concept involved in these statements (and Suarez himself identifies that concept as the foundation of his opinion in this crucial matter) is the fundamental simplicity of every being. If a thing can not be formally and intrinsically constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself, then of itself it is (whatever its intrinsic limitations) its own actuality. Here, then, as the very foundation of his teaching on created essence and existence, Suarez enumerates the very principle we have indicated above, the principle that a simple reality is both its own perfection and intrinsic lilnitation of that perfection. Given the fact of existence, the same reality which is its own very perfection of being is also of itself that which limits and restricts being to this limited thing. Potency and act are not really distinct principles which through a real composition intrinsically affect one another. For any Thomist the real identity of these two is unthinkable for many reasons; 417 of these reasons we will consider three. (1) Any being in which essence and existence are identical is pure act. But pure act is unique whereas creatures are multiple. Therefore, in creatures, essence and existence are distinct. The major is clear because any essence which is its own existence is its own being; and the being of existence which it is is actual being unreceived by any distinct and contracting principle and not ordered as potency to any further act; therefore it is- purely actual. The minor is also clear because pure act embraces all perfection; and the all perfect can be only one <1. Ibid., disp. XXXI, sect. 1, n. 18. ... Ibid., sect. 6, n. S. ... Cf. Del Prado, de Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae, pp. ll9-70. BASIS OF SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM 157 for if there were two or more no one of them could be all-perfect , for each would lack that actual being by which the other (or others) would be distinct. (~) If in creatures, essence and existence were identical, there would be among them no grades of nobility, for if that which participates being and the being participated do not differ there can not be in things a diverse participation of being and therefore a diversity of nobility. On the presumption, there is nothing to cause the diversity inasmuch as being, of itself, is simply being and not, in Thomistic thought, also a restriction and limitation of being. (3) The creature must be composed of a really distinct essence and existence; otherwise it would be infinite, for act, of itself is, in that order in which it is act, unlimited. Now being-of-existence is of itself being; if therefore it is not truly composed with a really distinct and limiting potency it is infinite being. The answer that actual being can be limited intrinsically by itself the Thomist rejects on the ground that perfection of itself is unlimited and unique. Wherever actuality is found in a limited, measured way, or wherever it is found multiplied it must be in union with a limiting or multiplying principle really distinct from itself. Act is that which by its very nature tends to give the plenitude of perfection of that order in which it is act. Whatever by nature, tends to give the full perfection of any order is not also that which limits and multiplies that same plenitude (since multiplication supposes a limitation). In view of this fundamental principle underlying Thomism (potency and act are really distinct principles which so divide being that whatever is is either Pure Act or composed of potency and act as distinct, intrinsic principles ) , the answer to the arguments of Suarez is easy.418 His first argument (the being sufficient for the truth of the proposition "Essence is " is only being of existence) is to be distinguished. Of being which is subsisting and absolute, it is conceded, but of being which is a participated being it is denied, 418 Ibid., pp. 15!'l-164. 158 THOMAS U. MULLANEY for the Thomist cannot forget St. Thomas' dictum, "Whenever something is predicated of another through participation there must be something there besides that which is participated , and therefore in any creature the creature which has existence is other than its very existence." 419 The second argument (the characteristics attributed to existence convene to the being of an actual essence) is also to be distinguished. These marks convene to such an essence precisely as it is existing and by reason of its existence, yes; but that they convene by reason of the essence alone is denied, for essences in themselves are eternal, necessary, and as such dependent on God's intellect rather than on His efficiency. Suarez' third argument proceeds thus: Existential being is that by which a created thing is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes, and by which it ceases to be nothing. But this is that being by which a created thing is constituted in the actuality of essence. Therefore, essence and existence are identical. Again the Thomist distinguishes. To the major he answers that existential being, as an act received in the essence, as an ultimate act inhering in the substance, constitutes a created thing outside its causes and outside nothing , yes; but that existential being as an act without a distinct subject so constitutes a thing is denied. The minor is distinguished in the same sense: this being as an act received in the essence and completing the substance constitutes the creature in its .actuality of essence yes; but as an unreceived act, it does llot, for not everything that actually is, is, of itself alone, actual. A thing can be actual either because it is act, or because, while potential in itself it participates act, for while there is no medium 'between possible being and existing being there is a medium between a possible thing and the act of existence namely, the essence which receives that act. Suarez frames his fourth argument in this way: Being in act is formally the same as existing. But an existing thing is formally constituted "9 Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur; et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse et ipsum esse ejus (Quodl. ~, a. 8). BASIS OF SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM 159 only through existence, so that it is really the same thing to say " man is " and to say " man is man," if in each case " is " indicates act and not merely aptitude or truth. The major is admitted but the minor is denied, because in everything outside God, the existing thing is not constituted in act by existential being alone since its existence is not per se stans, so to speak, but rather adheres to the substance which participates and receives it. Suarez' arguments are perfect indications of his mind for they rest, all of them, on the single concept we have already explicated, the concept that the principle of every being is fundamentally simple. In the first argument, for example, Suarez clearly assumes that all real being is actual existing being, t~at, in other words, this limited creature is its own actuality. Essentially the same concept underlies the other arguments. The second one asserts the fact that an actual essence is temporal, contingent, and so forth; what is presumed is that what convenes to a nature must convene to it by reason of itself, that the actual being which these notes characterize is identical with the essence. Suarez then is arguing in light of the judgment that this limited essence is also its own actuality. Having postulated such simplicity in things, Suarez was certain to reach this conclusion. The Thomist asks, granted that an essence as actual is temporal, contingent, etc., do these characteristics convene to it precisely by reason of itself, or by reason of its existential actuality? One little phrase at the end of the second argument (distinction is a result not a condition for being) sums up Suarez' thought succinctly. Distinction in the sense of distinction of things clearly supposes being as Suarez says; but the question is how can there be a distinction of actual things unless there be satisfied a prior condition of distinction in· the principles of things? Actual being of itself bespeaks only actual being; and actual being is not distinct from itself nor is it, of itself, multiplied and various. We should note here, too, that Suarez writes 420 that by the very fact that ••0 Disp. Meta., loco cit., n. 8. 160 THOMAS U. MULLANEY we conceive an actual being made by God we conceive it as existing. Since there is nothing false in that concept it follows that no added thing is necessary for the formal effect of existence . One can reach that conclusion from such premises only if one absolutely accepts the proposition that all being is simple; whatever fundamentally convenes to it, convenes to it by reason of one principle. The third and fourth arguments rest on this same assumption that what constitutes a thing as actual is identical with that which constitutes it this limited thing. What is basic to these arguments is that an existing thing is constituted only through existence (or actuality); that is, this intrinsically limited nature, or this intrinsically limited individual of such a nature, is exclusively through that perfection which is existence. The fundamentally simple reality which is that actual perfection is of itself its own restricting limitations. Consider, too, Suarez' negative argument for the identity and existence: 421 "Existing" cannot add any ratio distinct from that of an actual being outside its causes; hence there is no existence distinct from the being which constitutes each thing in the actuality of its essence. The very wording of the consequent shows Suarez' conc~ption of all being as itself actual being. Granted a thing to be actual in the order of essence and he concludes that that limited actuality is actual existential being. From the position, then, that created essence and existence are not really distinct (a position which rests, as we have shown, on the principle that all real being is actual of itself even when it is also, of itself, limited and restricted) certain consequential propositions are inevitable. To this class of consequential propositions can be reduced every major point of difference , in this matter of created essence and existencecbetween Suarez and the Thomists. The first of these (so intimately connected with the position that created essence and existence are identical as to be virtu- ,.. Ibid., sect. 5. BASIS OF SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM 161 ally contained in it) is the judgment that in the entitative order there is no composite to be made of essence and existence .422 This patently, rests on the principle that the very actual perfecting principle of acting is also, of itself, the limiting restricting principle, and so no real process is necessary to show the illation. If there is no composite to be formed, then, by rigorous necessity, the thing is entitatively simple; hence, one principle must embrace the two aspects found in the existing creature, namely, the perfection of actually being, and the limitation to being this restricted thing. Almost equally closely linked with the identification of essence and existence is Suarez' teaching that no created essence can be conserved through an existence other than its own, even through God's power.423 Thomists teach that the human nature of Christ did in fact exist, not through a connatural human existence, but through the existence of the Word of God, a teaching which supposes (among other things) that since an essence is potential for existence and not its own actuality (of existence) it can, by God's power be actuated by an existential act other than that connatural to it. The Suarezian teaching is a corollary from the identification of essence and existence, as is clear: If a thing is its own existence it cannot have another existence than its own because it cannot be other than itself. But that teaching rests on the premise that everything is entitatively simple; a thing cannot receive an existence other than its own, even by God's power, because it does not receive any entitative act at all; each limited creature is its own actuality. Following necessarily, too, on the identification of essence and existence, is Suarez' teaching that some existence can convene to things which are not supposites.For example, incomplete substantial existence can convene to a nature not yet subsisting; incomplete existence can convene to matter and to form, accidental existence to accidents, etc. These things have some essence; therefore if real essence is, of itself, existence, • 22 Ibid., sect. 18. ,2. Ibid., sect. l!'l. 16~ THOMAS U. MULLANEY these realities must of themselves, have some existence.424 The argument is easily grasped, but the Thomist cannot accept such an argument. Existence is that by which a thing is formally constituted outside its causes and outside nothing. Existence then, for the Thomist, since it places a thing outside its cause presupposes the causes of a thing to have already fully exercised their causality so that no further cause of that same order can cause the existing thing. So the Thomist does not admit a distinct existence of matter and form, for example, arguing that if each is existing, then each is already in the order of being beyond the causality of the other, beyond any intrinsic, substantially causal union. As the Thomist sees it, the only union possible between them is that which is had between two actual things, that is accidental union. How can realities so perfect in their own actuality that each is outside its causes and, therefore, beyond further causal intrinsic composition be yet so imperfect as to be incomplete in the order of essence, and crying out, so to speak, for composition with the other? As existing, they cannot mutually exercise substantial causality on one another; so how is their union substantial? Again the Thomist asks, what would an existing but not yet subsisting substantial nature be? As substantial, and outside its causes, it is beyond any further causality in the substantial order; how can it be other than subsisting? The same question arises with regard to the separate existence of primary matter. This matter of its essence is, formally, actually nothing ; its existence then would be the existence of that which is, formally speaking, no actual thing. As to a substantial form existing of itself, since it is beyond any intrinsic causality of matter, the Thomist argues, would it not be, in its order, unlimited actuality? But these objections, to Suarez, all miss the point. Because he starts with the judgment that that which is itself actual can be itself limited, incomplete, imperfect, he composes in one principle both aspects. Matter and form can exist independently for even existence can be incomplete, and imperfect; and so too for the other Thomistic arguments.·"Ibid., sect.H. BASIS OF SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM 163 Suarez· next concludes that creatures can be principal, not merely instrumental, causes of the existence of their effects.425 Having identified the essence of the effect (which clearly can be caused by a creature as by a principal cause) with its existence , he could not teach anything else without denying all principal causality to creatures. (Suarez' argument on this point is very interesting and has important ramifications for our principal interest, but before coming to that we must consider the Thomistic answer to this other question.) The Thomist holds that creatures can be only instruments in the production of any existence, because a power which is a principal cause of existence must be subsistent being, i. e., it must have existence of its very nature for a thing must first be such before it can produce a like thing and a created essence is not its existence. Suarez, of course, admits that such a cause must be its own existence, but denies that it is therefore, subsisting being. His arguments against the position that the creature effects such being, not being simply, are illuminating.426 In part, at least, they seem to rest on the motion that the action of the created cause must effect something or else it is not real action. If it effects something he would say that it must effect· (as a principal cause) an existing reality (again we notice the notion that what is real is of itself actual) for whatever is, is of itself actual even though it also be of itself limited. Suarez did not understand the Thomistic position that, since not all that is actual is itself act, a cause can be the principal cause of essence without being a principal cause of its existential actuality. What is of more interest to us is this: if the existence of an effect (action and its term) is from the creature as from a principal cause, then that cause is not premoved physically to the action, for a principal cause is that which, by its own proper power, and not by any instrumental force, produces its effect. If, then, a creature causes its action and the term of that action as a principal cause it does so by its own power; the ~ffect is by reason of that creature's own power, not ... Ibid., sect. 9. ••• Ibid., n; 12 ft. 164 THOMAS U. MULLANEY by reason of the application of that power through an instrumental force (physical premotion). It would follow that without premotion any created agent can have some second act depending on it causally; the very thing, then, which is by nature a potency, can have second act depending on it without God's premotion. Truly Suarez judged that whatever is, is, itself, actual. Intimately connected with this teaching that creatures can be principal causes of the existence of their effects is Suarez' stand that existence is really that through which creatures cause.427 This clearly supposes that a created existence of itself has all the limits and restrictions found in any secondary cause. A Thomist considers existence of itself as simple actuality in its order; if'it (per impossibile) were to act efficiently, its adequate effect could be only simple actuality in that order of being supposing no extrinsic limitation of its causality. That is not true for Suarez, and it is not true for him simply because he conceived the actual as intrinsically limited by itself. Side by side with these propositions which flow from Suarez' identification of the creature's essence and existenc~, are certain other judgments which are very revealing-his view of what is entailed in the Thomistic teaching of a real distinction. At the outset of his discussion, Suarez points out that if essence and existence are distinct, then by the very fact that each is really distinct from the other, as being from being, each has this that it is a being and distinct; and consequently one cannot, formally and intrinsically, be through that other.428 Here the interesting thing is the concept that things really distinct are distinct as being from being, one of which cannot constitute the other. Thomists, in maintaining the real distinction , do not imply that neither of the two can intrinsically constitute the other, for they never conceive these two as things, i. e., each a being in itself. Suarez did so conceive them (on the supposition of a real distinction) because, so it seems, he did not understand well the Thomistic teaching that the ,.