The Dialectics of War and Peace [Conclusion]

THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE (CoNCLUSION] HI, THE DIALECTICS OF WAR UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' REGIME The Pact of 1919 united to traditional principles certain new ideas inspired by a better understanding of the solidarity of states. The .states implicitly recognize the indivisibility of peace, as seen in art. II: "All wars and all threats of war, whether they affect directly or not one of the members of the society, interest the entire society, which must take all measures proper to the safeguarding of the peace of nation!L" Peace, therefore, forms an indivisible whole; and society assumes in its regard responsibilities distinct from those of the particular states. The latter again manifest their solidarity in presenting a united front against whoever would undertake a war of aggression; they engage themselves" to respect and to maintain against all exterior aggression the present territorial integrity and political independence of all the members of the society " (art. 10), Moreover, they bind themselves not to have recourse to war without first having submitted their differences either to arbitration and judicial ruling, or to the mediation of the CounciL They bind themselves, finally, to take certain measures of sanction against any state having recourse to war, in violation of the obligations of the Pact. By thus accepting "certain obligations not to have recourse to war," the states were introducing in modern international law, not so much the distinction between just wars and unjust wars as is sometimes claimed-this being a moral distinction-but at least its juridical projection, the distinction between legal and illegal wars, that is to say, wars in violation of the Pact. This was already an important innovation and filled with consequences. But-and this is a characteristic trait of this transitory 528 THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE 529 regime-the new principles did not eliminate the old ones which they contradicted. Notably, far from repudiating the sovereignty of the states, the Covenant consecrated it, in its fashion. It left the Assembly and the Council of the League the character of diplomatic conferences, subject as they were to the ruling of unanimity which paralyzed their action, but safeguarded the sovereignty of its members. It introduced in art. 15 the famous "reserve of sovereignty," which confirms the existence of "a domain reserved to the exclusive competency of the state " and excludes all control by the international community in this domain. Neither did it institute a true collective action against the state which had recourse to war in violation of the obligations of the Pact. In effect, if this covenant-breaking state was supposed to be committing an act of war against all the other members of the society, each member state decided for itself the measures by which it would acquit itself of the obligations of international solidarity which flowed from art. 16. The sanctions resulted less from an action of the society than from a conglomeration of individual measures. Again, it is in the meaning most favorable to the sovereignty of the states that art. 10 was interpreted: the states bound themselves to respect and defend against all exterior aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of other members, but these dispositions were the object of an interpretive resolution leaving each member the care of " judging . . . in which measure (it) is held to assure the execution of (its) obligation by the use of its military forces." Mutual assistance, promised in case of aggression, left intact the sovereignty of the states, and this, as always, entailed the" divisibility" of war. The Pact, in effect-and this is what we wish to notepreserved and consecrated in its fashion the classical notion of war. The authors of the Pact place themselves in the traditional dialectical framework of war and peace. Their aim being " to assure international peace and security," the means to which they have recourse is "the acceptance of certain obligations not to have recourse to war." The method is clear: the states' right to war is not more contested, at bottom, than their 580 J. T. DELOS sovereignty. To assure peace, the problem is to make the states voluntarily accept certain renunciations of the use of their right...