Philosophical Studies in Honor of The Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P. ed. by John K. Ryan (review)

BOOK REVIEWS Philosophical Studies in Honor of The Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, 0. P. Edited by JoHN K. RYAN. Westminster: Newman, 195~. Pp. 310 with index. $5.00. The very fact that such a book was conceived is a tribute to the Deanship and Professorship that Fr. Smith has held these many years. It is difficult to give an _opinion on all the varied subjects touched upon in these studies. Roughly they deal with problems of science and philosophy, metaphysics in general, ethics and history. In a somewhat arbitrary fashion let us take the study on The Recognition of Miracles by Rev. Dr. Allen B. Wolter, 0. F. M. The problem is interesting , and Fr. Wolter brings out clearly that, analysed from the point of view of common sense and the character of science, it must be admitted that in the time, place and manner in which certain phenomena happen one cannot account for them in any natural fashion. Beyond this the study brings up two points of discussion that reoccur as problems in some of the other papers, namely: the character of science and the character of metaphysics . As regards science Fr. Wolter raises the position that "it is generally admitted today that all physical laws are in last analysis statistical in character and that the fundamental process of nature exhibits an intrinsic indeterminism that defies expression in terms of classical causality." (pp. Q38-239) This is a statement of a general opinion; but Fr. Wolter seems to handle science as dealing with probabilities, indeterminism and chance as though science were directly dealing with these concepts in their. philosophical connotation. As philosophers we all have difficulties with science but might we have a few less if we did not give scientific notions an immediate philosophical significance? Take for example causality. It seems that science takes for granted the natural physical world of beings and their causality. But in trying to determine ho.w one physical thing is going to act and react, in trying to handle the complex situation, the scientist began by translating some of the actions into mechanistic terms, considering but a few factors. The mechanistic view was a schematization of reality in which certain factors were considered as negligible or as absolutely unchanging conditions in relation to which the other factors varied. The varying factors were measured and their relations established. In the supposed absolute schema these could then be taken as the initial moment of a mathematical problem, the solution of which represented a physical situation resulting from the first situation. Causality from this outlook ::U9 120 BOOK REVIEWS had the rigidity of a mathematical calculation and the same rigid determination . It is this understanding of determinism that the new physics seems to change because it alters the classical mechanical concepts. For example, as to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Abro shows that it is impossible to have a direct measure both of position and of momentum at the same time-so that we can predict a future correlation of these measurements at a future moment. In the very measuring, for example, of position we give a kick, as it were, to the momentum; and so increase it. With no absolute initial moment we cannot calculate, as in classical mechanics, a future situation in any absolute fashion. Thus there cannot be predication in the same fashion as supposed in classical mechanism. But actually, causality is not in question in either of these positions. They both suppose physical causality as going on (in fact it is the causality of our measuring instrument that modifies the momentum); but neither of the scientific positions is treating of cause in the philosophical sense. Neither rule out cause nor does either establish or help to establish free will. In line with this discussion on science, the study of Bishop Joseph M. Marling, C. PP. S. on The Dialectical Chamcter of Scientific Knowledge should be mentioned. Bishop Marling juxtaposes philosophy and science as knowledge and opinion, or as he says: "science (which includes metaphysics , mathematics and physics) and dialectic (which embraces opinion, probability, faith, and doubt) as a type of knowledge below the level of science." (p. 4) True, there may be...