Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege ed. by Peter Geach, Max Black (review)

104 BOOK REVIEWS cause present for grave punishment they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason." Indeed, many writers who uphold the liceity of punitive sterilization make much capital out of this statement. Yet the Pope seems to have, implicitly at least, described punitive sterilization as a direct interference with bodily integrity. And if punitive sterilization is direct it would fall under the condemnation of the Holy Office which in 1931 declared that direct sterilization of man or woman, whether perpetual or temporary, is contrary to the natural law. Is punitiv~ sterilization direct or indirect? Does it not, to use the words of Pope Pius XII, aim at making procreation impossible? What is the object of this sterilizing act? And even if we must make a gesture in this context to the intention of the State authorities in imposing sterilization as a punishment-must we not say that: they intend to make procreation impossible, at least as a means? We have queried a number of points in Fr. Kenny's work. But we would wish that our doing so should be interpreted as an expression of our belief that the work is a valuable contribution to the literature on medical ethics and of our hope that there will be further editions in the preparation of which the objections we have raised may be kept in mind. And if it is not unpardonable to end on a slightly facetious note we, of this eastern hemisphere , should love to know what the " skedger wegers " (p. 4) really are! St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, Eire JoHN McCARTHY Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by PETER GEACH and MAX BLACK. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. ~44 with index. $5.'75. Mr. Geach and Mr. Black have rendered a signal service in translating and editing, and the Philosophical Library in publishing, these scattered fragments from the works of the great German mathematician, Gottlob Frege. For it was Frege who exercised a profound and decisive influence on men like Russell and Wittgenstein, and of whom it may be said that his was perhaps the most profound and seminal influence leading to the development of modern mathematical logic. And yet despite his greatness, essays such as these which are indispensable for an understanding of the semantical and even logical import of Frege's work, "have," in the words of the editors, "long been buried in various German periodicals (mostly now defunct)." Nevertheless, merely bringing these essays to light, and even bringing BOOK REVIEWS 105 them to light in such remarkably clear and smooth translations as these, will doubtless not in itself guarantee that Frege will come to be readily understood and appreciated. For like so many great seminal thinkers, Frege is a man whose thought would seem to be quite as ponderous as it is important, and quite as crabbed and involved as it is suggestive. Accordingly, in attempting to survey and appraise this somewhat difficult material, this reviewer wonders if it might not be illuminating, even if somewhat unorthodox, to try to bring out the contrast between Frege's notion of logic and some of the dominant ideas that might be said to be operative in a more traditional, Aristotelian type of logic. That such an approach is unorthodox may be seen from the fact that it is not Frege's own approach. Instead, his initial concern is with mathematics and with providing an adequate account of basic mathematical concepts; and it would always seem to be from some such point of departure that he moves on to logical and semantical questions. Thus in none of the selections here given does Frege attempt anything like a direct or developed account of how his view of logic differs from the traditional one. Nevertheless, suppose for purposes of argument that we project a possible interpretation of Aristotelian logic and then consider some of the points of contrast between it and Frege's view of the subject. Thus on the Aristotelian view it might be supposed that logic is concerned with the tools or instruments of knowledge. Moreover, as...