The Structure of the Judgment—A Reply to Fr. Wall, O. P.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENTA REPLY TO FR. WALL, 0. P. IN a recent issue of the TnE THOMIST there appeared an interesting article by Fr. Kevin Wall, 0. P. entitled" The Structure of the Concept." 1 One section of this article seems to contain some mistakes, and since the argument of that section is central to Fr. Wall's thesis, it may be useful to comment on it. Fr. Wail proposes to set out a convincing argument that concepts must have parts in some sense other than that in which we speak of dividing them by genus and differentia. Such an argument, he says, is provided by " a consideration of the essence of human conception as ordered to judgment." I quote his argument in full: The judgment is basically the attribution of a predicate to a subject. When we say: A is B, we attribute the predicate conception B to the subject conception A. Now the fact of this attribution, if investigated as to its nature and possibility, indicates that both A and B (the symbolic representation of any concept whatsoever) have structure. For the judgment affirms that A is B, that is to say, that A and B are identical. But it also affirms, by the fact that there is a judgment at all, that A and B are different. If A and B are not identical then the judgment is impossible. It does not simply relate two distinct entities but poses them as identical, so that any relation besides that of identity excludes the judgment. If A and B are not different, on the other hand, then the judgment is likewise impossible or at least futile by reason of tautology. AU that can be known of an object in such a case, is sufficiently achieved in one simple conception of it. It therefore follows, from the nature of the judgment, that A and B are both identical and different. How is such a situation possible? Clearly A and B can be both identical and different only if they 1 THE THOMIST, XVHI (April 1955), 228-241. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENT 233 possess composition and a structure. They must necessarily be composed of fundamental parts. In virtue of one part possessed in common, they are identical. In virtue of another part different in both, they are distinct one from the other. The judgment affirms the identity of A and B in virtue of the intued common part, and poses their distinction in virtue of the intued divergent parts. That this is necessarily true is brought out by considering another possible position. A and B are simple contents. If this be the case, and they are identified in any way, as is essential to the judgment, then they are totally identified and the judgment is pure tautology. It becomes a useless act of the mind. This article will not attempt to show that concepts either have or have not got structure; it win be concerned simply with the argument as quoted above. There may be good reasons fo:r saying that concepts are structured but I shall suggest that none of them are contained in the quotation given. I hope to show that Fr. Wall's analysis of the judgment is mistaken and to recommend an alternative analysis. This alternative analysis is the one proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas. With Fr. Wall's first statement in the above quotation I am in full agreement; every other categorical statement in the quotation seems to me to be false. This may very well be due to my failure to understand him and so it will be well to begin by explaining how I interpret some of the things he says. He says: "We say: A is B "; in view of this, I take him to mean that " A is B " is a formula for a sentence, and I am sure that he means an indicative sentence which is being used to make a true or false statement. When he says that A and B are symbolic :representations of any concept whatsoever, I take him to mean that in the formula "A is B " we may substitute for " A " and " B...