The Physical World of the Greeks by S. Sambursky, and: Initiation à la Philosophie d’Aristote by M. D. Philippe, O. P. (review)

370 BOOK REVIEWS The Physical World of the Greeks. By S. SAMBURSKY. Translated by Merton Dagut. Pp. ~65 with list of sources quoted and index. New York: Macmillan, 195'7. $4.00. Initiation ala Philosophie d'Aristote. By M. D. PHILliPPE, 0. P. Pp. ~49. Paris: La Colombe, 1956. These two works treating of Greek science and philosophy stand in sharp contrast to each other. The one, by a physicist at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is a kind of commentary on texts selected from many classical sources and translated by the author in the course of his studies. The other, by a philosopher, is an outline of Aristotle's teaching presented as an organic whole consisting of many different parts. One is historically broad in scope. Although not a history even of Greek science, it presents the methods and achievements of many scientists from different schools of ancient thought, and professes to show a certain similarity between their views and those held particularly by some modem physicists, together with differences in aim and emphasis no less remarkable. The other analyzes the broad sweep of Aristotle's thought not only in logic and natural philosophy but also in metaphysics and the moral sciences. One introduces different thinkers and doctrines without clarifying their his~ torical connections and inner relations. The other shows the doctrine of Aristotle as a coherent synthesis born from the conflict of contrasting views and competing theories. One offers selections and criticisms of physical concepts from an assumed and restricted point of view. The other presents aU the essentials of Aristotle's philosophy as they can be grasped by a careful study of his copious writings. On one important point both writers agree. The ancient Greeks had little desire to conquer nature or to exploit it technically. They saw the physical world as a cosmos or organized whole, not as an abstract mathematical entity, and so they did not attempt to analyze it by systematic experimentation nor to explain it by laws and theories expressed in mathematical formulae. They were motivated by purely intellectual curiosity and aimed at the theoretical understanding of nature, without attempting to combine pure knowledge with practical applications. Nevertheless, they discovered the basic principles of the scientific approach to reality which are still valid as ever, and they tried to give a rational explanation of things within the framework of general hypotheses expressing the laws of the cosmos, without distinguishing between scientific investigation and philosophical reflection. However, our authors do not entirely agree in their interpretations of the basic principles of the scientific approach. Professor Sambursky emphasises those efforts of the Pythagoreans and Stoics which gave promise of BOOK REVIEWS 371 systematic experimentation and more inclusive mathematical formulation, and acknowledges that these are achieved at the expense of all hope for necessary truth and ultimate certitude. He gives no hint of the scientific methodology elaborated by Aristotle, but asserts that " Aristotle's attitude leads nowhere and offers no hope of fruitful research in the natural sciences." (p. 47) Pere Philippe faithfully sketches the broad outlines of Aristotle's logic and shows it to be not only an advance beyond the methods of Socrates, Plato and the Sophists but also a marvelous instrument for the purposes of precise and rigorous thought. Contrary to what has often been stated, Aristotle's method is not at all dogmatic, -nor is it simply deductive. Respect for the facts of sensory experience together with clear intuition or induction of principles are everywhere acknowledged to be logically prior to deduction. Aristotle is quoted as saying that Plato did not sufficiently base his theories on experience (cf. p. 69) and indeed frankly admitted (in the Post. Anal. 76a 25) that it is often difficult to be sure that we have attained a true principle of demonstration. In justice to Aristotle we must concede that if he was mistaken in some cases and ignorant in many others, it was not because his general methodology is at fault, but because the data at his disposal were necessarily limited in scope and accuracy, and because he was engaged with many other matters besides those of natural science. In the nature of the case, Aristotle's...