Ethical Value by George F. Hourani (review)

BOOK REVIEWS graduate work in logic. Besides a very fine selected bibliography on symbolic logic at the end of the book, there are also pages of excellent exercises for the student. Finally on this subject we should point out that some mathematical logicians do not claim to be philosophers and most philosophers will admit that they are not mathematical logicians. The fact is that mathematical logic has not swept anyone off his feet other than the members of the symbolic logic fraternity. By this we do not want to dismiss symbolic logic, but its claims to greater exactness are simply not borne out and its philosophical foundations are open to serious question. By way of summary, we might say that these five volumes at least indicate that the English speaking philosophical world is not asleep. The modern philosopher in America, England, and Australia is facing the problems of men, seeking solutions, defending old and new positions, abandoning false systems, and abreast with much of the thinking in the non-English speaking world. Hence, to all these authors and for all these books, any criticisms not withstanding, a warm word of congratulations is in order. Dominican House of Philosophy, Dover, Mass. RAYMOND SMITH, o. P. Ethical Value. By GEORGE F. HouRANI. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan University Press, 1956. Pp. ~33. $4.50. Dr. Hourani's designation of "value" is in terms of satisfaction, and he believes that it is not possible to substitute for satisfaction some such ideas as pleasure or happiness. Perhaps closer to his designation would be " fulfillment of desire." But he would not allow us to say that value or good-he does not sharply distinguish between them-is the desirefulfilling aspect of things. The satisfaction of which he speaks is a characteristic of the subject rather than of the object. He sums things up {pp. 118-9): "It was maintained in previous chapters that the goodness of experience is one thing-actual satisfaction; that that of things is another-potential satisfaction; and that moral goodness is again different, consisting of a will to produce good experiences and things." Good is said to be analysable in terms of satisfaction, and right, as the best or top good, in terms of good. As for the ethical good, this likewise is put in terms of satisfaction. An act is said to be good " in the event," if and so far as it " creates more satisfaction than dissatisfaction on the whole, including its own intrinsic satisfactoriness as well as that of its consequences, and distributes this BOOK REVIEWS satisfaction between persons with some degree of justice." No doubt this statement is difficult, not merely because the sentence is long and a trifle complicated, but because we have to appeal to the immediate in order to know what " satisfaction " and " dissatisfaction " are and to suppose the terms stand for something known in the same way by all men. Then, too, it concludes with "justice," which we must suppose has to be delimited in terms of " good." At several places we find ourselves asking whether Dr. Hourani's definings are enlightening and useful. They do not evidently make headway. For instance, he says (p. 100): "It would be roughly true to say that an action is ' morally good ' in proportion as the act is done from a good will, and that a good will is one which wills an act which it thinks good 'in the event.'" Now aside from the fact that a will does not think at all, we seem to have gone around in a pointless circle. The author several times does this; he never apologizes for it and seems to be unaware of a circular statement's futility. It is easy to see that the author is considerably under the influence of Kant, both in doctrine and in language. He is even more under the influence of the British " empirical " school of moral philosophers, and has made a rather complete coverage of G. E. Moore, Ross, Broad, and Ewing. Besides, he is frank in saying from the start that his chief interest is terminology. As he says, his is a study in "linguistic behavior." In short, he studies...