Order and History. Volume II: The World of the Polis by Eric Voegelin (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 381 Order and History. Volume II: The World of the Polis. By ERIC VoEGELIN. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. Pp. 407. $6.00. This book is the second volume of a proposed six volume series, entitled generally, Order and History, and given the specific divisions of Ismel and Revelation, the World of the Polis, Plato and Aristotle, Empire and Christianity, The Protestant Centuries, and The Crises of Western Civilizations . Since the present reviewer has read neither volume one nor volume three, he might be at a serious disadvantage in discussing volume two. Presumably volume one might have enabled him to gain a more adequate grasp of the basic theme or scheme underlying Professor Vaegelin's gigantic and erudite Order and History. But even if the present volume were seen in relation to its predecessor and planned successors, The World of the Polis would still remain in part a bewildering and even annoying book. It is bewildering because it encompasses a vast range of controversial detail; and it is annoying not only because of its (planned?) omissions or distortions, but also because the reader cannot always be sure of the author's real intention, unless it be the unwarranted and uncompromising exaltation of " order " above all else. In his introductory observations-Mankind and History-which are somewhat under the spell of Toynbee's (as well as Spengler's and Hegel's) scheme of history or " historicism," Professor Voegelin insists that " the struggle for the truth of order is the very circumstance of history." (p. 2) Aside from its obscure meaning, this statement in its dogmatic-doctrinaire content is open to challenge. The reviewer also has some difficulty in understanding Voegelin's "leap in being "-a term with which the author seems to be enamored-and especially in grasping the significance of " [t]he initial leap in being, the break with the order of the myth." (pp. 3 ff.) The elaborations of this " leap in being," which allegedly constitutes the "break with the order of myth," appear to be somewhat labored without, however, succeeding in clarifying its significance. One may raise the question here whether in the continuity of the various "leaps in being" every subsequent "leap " is not a "break with a myth." If this be so, then everything preceding the "latest leap " would be "myth ": the " old order" would always be "myth," and the new order always " truth," but " truth " destined to suffer the fate of being relegated to the realm of " myths " as soon as a newer " order " has been achieved by some " new leap." Voegelin's discussion of the transition "from myth to philosophy" (pp. 111-240) is simply confusing. During its various stages, Greek philosophy , in the main, was a combination of two opposite theories about the sources of human knowledge: the senses and what may be called a "profection " of the mind " outside " the body and " beyond the senses." This 382 BOOK REVIEWS " projection " is something like an " apprehension " of that type of " wisdom " or " truth " which can never be attained through the medium of the senses alone. The pioneering work of the " sense perceptionalists " presumably was done by the " School of Cos " (Hippocrates and his disciples). As a matter of fact, it could be argued that this School of Cos marks the real beginning of the " scientific method " and, hence, the break-away from "myth." However, the problem is not that simple. Plato, for instance, did not seek the basis for science or knowledge in the sensible world. (In Plato's time not one of the present-day specialized sciences, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc., had any "scientific" status or even any existence.) Hence, it cannot have been the purpose of his theory of Ideas to provide science with a "methodology." Plato was, in the first instance, attempting to give an account of that knowledge which in his opinion must direct the conduct of human life. It was thus that his theory of Ideas grew into a doctrine of the "intelligible nature of things," consciously opposed to "materialism." How, then, can man attain to the proper knowledge of the " good " or the " true," especially since, according to the Platonic...