Le Dilemme du Concours Divin par Louis Rasolo, S. J. (review)

BOOK REVIEWS Le Dilemme du Concours Divin. Par Lams RAsOLO, S. J. (Roma: AnaL Greg., voL 80). Pp. 134. $~j!5. After four centuries of disputation the debate between Molinists and Thomists of another persuasion still continues lively as ever. In spite of basic agreement on certain facts and principles, the opposing schools of thought remain far apart in their theoretical explanations and show few signs of rapprochement. The present volume has the merit of simplifying and clarifying the discussion by considering the divine concursus from a philosophical point of view, abstracting from theological difficulties concerning grace and predestination. This in no way lessens the value or interest of the work, because the philosophical questions are truly basic, and the principles for their solution can be extended and applied also to theological problems. Here the manner of the divine premotion is studied in the light of the distinction between essence and existence. In his introductory chapter the author considers two preliminary objections which have been made against Molinism, one regarding its method and the other regarding its fidelity to St. Thomas. The method of Molinism has been judged by some other Thomists to be eclectic and apologetic rather than philosophic. These critics say that it is a way to reconcile human liberty with divine foreknowledge, and to refute the errors of Protestants in these matters, by proposing a notion of liberty which is descriptive and popular, not philosophical, and then proceeding to dissect the free action in order to decide which part of it is from God and which part from man. Furthern10re, not only the method but also the doctrine of Molinism is said to be far from the relevant principles and conclusions of St. Thomas. In reply the author asserts points of agreement and disagreement. All reasoning begins with facts and principles and a question to be solved. Catholics generally agree in admitting the primacy of God and the contingency of the creature. Both Molinists and other Thomists agree also on the real distinction between potency and act, essence and existence. The facts of human freedom and divine foreknowledge raise a genuine problem as to how these can be reconciled, and this question must be solved in the light of the principle of causality. If God determines the actions of creatures, we may still ask whether He predetermines them physically or only morally and indifferently. As for fidelity to St. Thomas, when he speaks of infallible predetermination does he mean that this is physical or moral? Molinists hold that the autodetermination of the will is incompatible wi.th physical predetermination, and so the divine premotion must 556 BOOK REVIEWS 557 be indifferent, not predetennining. For this reason also they admit a special division of the divine knowledge, i. e., scientia media, by which God foreknows the free actions of creatures under any and all circumstances. How this position is related to the doctrine of St. Thomas cannot be detennined by citing texts one way or the other, but must be decided in view of the proper principles. The author proposes to show that Molinism is based on sound metaphysical foundations and is genuinely Thomistic. The essential data of our problem are simple: the creature truly is and acts, but with dependence upon God. The difficulty is that these data seem irreconcilable. If the creature is totally dependent upon God, then everything is from God, both being and action. But if the creature is a cause in any real sense it must have some independence and primacy, and something in the effect must really come from the creature. In the face of this difficulty Malebranche preferred to deny the causality of creatures, whereas Durandus had denied the immediate causality of God in the actions of creatures. Molinists and other Thomists alike hold that effects come both from God and from created causes as the fruit of a collaboration or concursus. In the actions and effects of creatures these thinkers generally acknowledge both reality and specification, that is, esse and dett'nnination, or existence and essence. The creature really acts, but it remains to be seen how far its causality extends, whether to the esse and the detennination of the...