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ACTION AT A DISTANCE I INTRODUCTION T HE explicit problem in action at a distance is: " Can an agent body the substantial reality of which does not in any way touch a patient body, e. g., at its surface , affect the patient without using a third body called a medium? The problem must be understood in this way if the following discussion is to become intelligible. To the imagination this proposition seems impossible or, at least, seems to require some mysterious occurrence which once granted cannot be explained. Besides, every action experienced in our universe can 'be, or seems to be, adequately explained by means of surface contact, either directly between the agent and patient or between the agent through a mediating body and the patient. A legitimate question at this point would be: " Why does the problem even arise; how, indeed, can there be a problem? " Now, we might say that the problem appears because of some physical phenomena investigated and explained during the history of physical science, for example, that of light. Although we will have occasion to refer to some such scientific questions, the philosophical problem, however arises from the nature o~ certain notions used to describe corporeal reality and in particular that corporeal activity which is called transient action, namely, such notions as " action," " distance," " contact," " medium." This paper rests upon the conviction that these notions, for the most part, have failed to describe corporeal reality adequately; more specifically, these notions fail adequately to explain transient action. To support this view we will examine the notions and assumptions latent in the various types of arguments used to prove the impossibility of action at a distance. Since Professor Van Laer has done a commendable job in surveying and grouping these arguments and, moreover, has added one of his 252 ACTION AT A DISTANCE own to the list, we shall first consider his work, one of the latest essays on the subject.1 n PROBLEM It may be well to preface our consideration of Van Laer's arguments with the opinion that his formulation of the arguments against action at a distance is well stated; moreover, one may also argue that his criticisms of the proofs other than his own are valid, for none of them demonstrates the impossibility of action at a distance. Some beg the question; others, as Van Laer points out, deduce ambiguous conclusions. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to reproduce here an analysis that is already quite clear. For our concern is not, in the first place, with the logical validity of the arguments, but with a fundamental insight at the basis of all such arguments. This is the principle that presence is necessary for action. It may be possible , indeed, to reduce all arguments to the use of the same principle expressed in five different ways, corresponding to the five typical groups of arguments which Van Laer examines. The following table, to be read in conjunction with Van Laer shows, on the left, a summary formulation of the principles on which rest each of these" ways"; on the right is indicated how presence plays an essential role in all of them. 1. An agent acts only where it exists. 2. Distant bodies are not in contact. 8. Accidents are only where they exist. 4. The causal relationship im1 . One body: As an agent it is present to itself. 2. Two bodies: One as an agent is not present to and is distant from another as a patient. 8. The accident of activity: As inhering in a body it is present to itself and its substance. 4. Two bodies: If they are in 1 P. Henry Van Laer, Philosophico-Scientific Problems, trans., Henry J. Koren (Pittsburgh, 1958), pp. 59-114, esp. pp. 79-94. fl54 JAMES TALLARICO plies an intimate union, and bodies are intimate only by local contact. 5. Action at a distance, taken as a propagation through empty space, would prevent direct action. local contact they must be and are present to one another. 5. The accident of activity: When it is between the agent and patient, it is present to neither. The first argument obviously means that action at a distance would...

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