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THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXVIII OCTOBER, 1964 No.4 HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? THE QUESTION of the pleasurable good presents two levels of difficulty. One is the level of understanding. What do we mean by the pleasurable good-the bonum delectabile? After analyzing this notion, and noting that the expression bonum delectabile has more than one meaning, we can, at this level, suggest an answer to how good the pleasurable good is. The second level of difficulty concerns more the practical problem of the role of pleasure in moral life. To what extent, or how, can we seek a pleasurable good as an object of desire? We shall be concerned primarily with the first level of difficulty, but in the light of what we can show about the nature of the pleasurable good, we can also discuss in a general way the role pleasure can play in moral life. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the occasion for discussing pleasure in relation to human life. It is enough to suggest that pleasure is frequently misunderstood, both as to what it is and what part it can play. The hedonist approach offers one solution -pleasure above everything else is to be sought at all 391 392 JOHN A. OESTERLE times; moral life consists in gratifying our pleasure-seeking instincts . There is, of course, the opposite extreme: pleasure is somehow not a real good unless it can be related to some intrinsic good; it is basically only instrumental in character and hence not something to be sought in any way in and of itself. It is difficult not to gravitate toward one of these extreme positions . The task is to see if there is truly a mean position which will establish just how good the pleasurable good is-that it may not be as good as some think, but on the other hand that it is, after all, a good. Let us consider first how Aristotle introduces and develops the notion along with some observations St. Thomas has to make. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, after considering the purpose of moral philosophy, Aristotle seeks an answer to the most important question of practical knowledge: What is the ultimate good or end for man? "Verbally there is wide agreement; for both the general run of men and people say that it is happiness, and they identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is, they differ...." 1 Note that there is general agreement, not only in the name "happiness," 2 but also in identifying living well and doing well with being happy. This identification of happiness with activity of some kind is necessary for understanding the problem we are investigating, for, as we shall see, pleasure implies activity or operation. 1 Nicomachean Ethics I, 4 (1095a 16-20). • The translation of eillia.tp.ovla. as " happiness " is objected to by Sir David Ross in the following terms: " The conventional translation ' happiness ' is unsuitable in the Ethics; for whereas ' happiness ' means a state of feeling, differing from 'pleasure' only by its suggestion of performance, depth, and serenity, Aristotle insists that eillia.tp.ovLa. is a kind of activity; that it is not any kind of pleasure, though pleasure naturally accompanies it. The more non-committal translation 'well-being' is therefore better." (Aristotle, Meridian Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p. 186.) However, the very ambiguity of the word " happiness," signifying indeterminately " a state of well-being," is particularly appropriate, for at the outset everyone can agree that we seek something like this, familiarly known as " happiness ," leaving open the question in what it determinately consists. The whole of moral philosophy will then be devoted principally to giving, so far as possible, a resolution to this basic question. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 898 Following his usual procedure, Aristotle begins to inquire into the various opinions on happiness. Significantly enough, the first one he reports identifies happiness with pleasure. Having noted that this view is "not without some...

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