Some Causes of the Elimination of Causality in Contemporary Science

SOME CAUSES OF THE ELIMINATION OF CAUSALITY IN CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE MANY QUESTIONS are being raised in the philosophy of science-questions such as, "What is science?"; "What are its aims?"; "What is its methodology?" " What is the relationship of scientific theory to empirical fact? ". This latter question together with its correlative, "What is the place of causality in contemporary science?", will be investigated in this article. Ample evidence indicates that the views which some " bench scientists " hold on these matters tend to be naive. Indeed, many work-a-day scientists are in nearly complete ignorance of the views discussed by more articulate spokemen concerning the philosophy of science. Most scientists may say that they don't particularly care about the philosophy of science. This is certainly a very comfortable attitude, even though it is exceedingly ostrichlike in its characteristics. It is ostrichlike because many problems raised in philosophy of science have had and will have profound repercussions for them and their sciences. Men are saying things in the philosophy of science which we cannot afford to ignore. Some of these men are from the usual ranks of self-appointed spokesman, but many speak with the full authority of the scientist. The prominence and importance of science in our contemporary society cannot be denied. Nevertheless, certain responsibilities go hand in hand with being in the spotlight. Among these is the obligation that scientists explain to others (as well as to themselves), not only what they are really doing, but what they are even talking about. This calls for a genuine and sometimes agonizing reappraisal of science. Perhaps " appraisal " might be the better word, for 60 SOME CAUSES OF THE ELIMINATION OF CAUSALITY 61 many have not taken time to reflect at all on this matter. Many scientists would be unpleasantly surprised if they attempted to answer certain questions in the philosophy of science . Even the attempt to formulate these questions would prove a formidable task, for it is no easy thing to pose an intelligent question. Indeed, a question cannot be well formulated unless one already knows a good deal about the answer. Yet, we agree with Planck that there are such things as " phantom problems." 1 Although many practical scientists have ignored the philosophy of science, other scientists (together with some who are not scientists) have been influential in alternately clarifying and beclouding the future directions of science. We may be amazed by what they say. We may not like what they have to say. We may eventually dismiss what they have to say, but we cannot ignore what they have to say. The authority of spokeman such as Einstein, Planck, Mach, Bohr, Heisenberg, Eddington and Jeans, is at least sufficient to command our attention. Yet there are others who may not be so familiar, but who have had much to contribute. Such men are P. Frank, H. Poincare, P. Duhem, R. Carnap, L. Wittgenstein , B. Russell, and M. Schlick. Everyone of them has had a strong influence in determining the course of the philosophy of science. Let us briefly trace the historical background from which current problems in the philosophy of science have arisen. A schism developed between philosophy and science at the end of the middle ages and the beginning of the modern era. We refer to the period of Francis Bacon and the 16th century. Bacon was no scientist, but he was a trumpeteer for the new science. Ample testimony for this assertion is found in his Novum Organum and in his On the Proficience and Advancement of Learning. Prior to this era, science and philosophy 1 Cf. Max Planck, "Phantom Problems in Science" in Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, tr. Frank Gaynor (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 52-79. 62 GERALD F. KREYCHE had constituted a unity. However, at this time it began to appear that the embrace of the two was more of a stranglehold -especially to science-and in many ways it proved to be just that. L'affaire Galileo demonstrates the point. Hence, it seemed that science would have to bid adieu to philosophy. The breakup occurred not at once, of course, but over a period of centuries. Traditionally, philosophy concerned itself...