The Gnoseological Transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann’s Metaphysics of Cognition

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXX JANUARY, 1966 No.1 THE GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION INTRODUCTION IT IS STILL too early to evaluate justly Nicolai Hartmann 's work and significance. The inclinations and interests of a generation usually are directed towards the seasonable, that is, towards whatever is said or written for and in the present time. The problems of the philosophia perennis, the recurring problems of the centuries, are not as attractive as contemporary interests, but Hartmann devoted himself inexorably to those profound, perennial problems. However, where the progress of knowledge ramified into new directions, Hartmann pointed them out and called for teamwork in researching them. Hartmann's own work comprises many branches of philosophy . His early works 1 show him deeply anchored in the be1 Platons Logik des Seins (Plato's Logic of Being), ed. by H. Cohen and P. 1 CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER gmnmgs of classical Western Philosophy. These early works surprise the student with Hartmann's mental capacity and dimensions. Joseph Klein said the first work, Platons Logik des Seins, is a hymnus demonstrativus to Cohen's philosophy of the origin. The methodical Idealism is presented there in a manner which was not even displayed in the works of the heads of the [Marburg] School.2 In the works of young Hartmann, who, at that time, was a fervent adherer to the Marburg school, are found propositions which foreshadow his later thinking. They indicate already the philosophical metanoia of Nicolai Hartmann, who was intensively occupied by the search for his own philosophical standpoint. He admits that from 1922 the theory of cognition was the main object of his thought which earlier (in 1915) had brought him into conflict with the position of the School of Marburg. He states: One of the most responsible questions of a system ... [is] the position regarding the much debated correlation: Subject-object. . . . On its inner disposition depends the problem of the systematic holding especially of idealism and realism with all their subspecies.3 And then he announces his own conviction: The classical solution to this question was given by Kant. According to him cognition is only possible when there is something identical in thought and being. But this identical something is not the full object with its infinite determinations. This lies forever as entity beyond what is recognized ... [and] in that datum consists the necessary non-identity of thought and being.4 Natorp in the collection Philosophische Arbeiten (Philosophical Works), Vol. III, p. x, 512, Berlin, Topelmann, 1909, and Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgruende der Mathematik (Proclus Diadochus' Philosophical Beginnings of Mathematics), in the same collection, Vol. IV, 1909. 2 Joseph Klein, op. cit., p. 109-110. 3 Nicolai Hartmann, " Systembildung und Idealismus " (Systematic Structure and Idealism), in Kleinere Schriften (Shorter Essays), Vol. III, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958, p. 65. • Nicolai Hartmann, " Systembildung und Idealismus," loc cit., p. 67: " Die klassische Loesung dieser Frage hat Kant gegeben. Erkenntnis ist nach ihm freilich NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION 3 This non-identity of idea and being became Hartmann's motto in his philosophical strife " against the Marburg Logical Idealism and Neo-Kantianism on the whole." 5 Due to this insight Aristotle, Kant and Hegel appeared in a different light. Hartmann devoted to them special treatises. At the same time, however, Hartmann remained alert to and receptive of novel contemporary positions as, for instance, those of Husserl and Scheler. Heidegger's subjective existentialism, however, never received Hartmann's applause. Hartmann's philosophical development can be passed along with his writings. In 1919 "the breakthrough to a new ontology was completed." 6 Its first document is Grundzuege einer Metaphymk der Erkenntnis/ This book is considered the basic and pioneering work of Hartmann's entire teaching. Hartmann's philosophical interest turned further to ethical 8 and ontological problems, which he documented in the following inqumes: Zur Grundlegnng der Ontologie,9 considered a prolegomena to Hartmann's ontological positions; Moeglichkeit und Wirklichkeit/0 Hartmann's study of potentiality and actuality; Der Aufbau der realen Welt...