Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment ed. by Edward H. Madden, Rollo Handy, Marvin Farber (review)

~00 BOOK REVIEWS But, if one can make a clear judgment about the collective guilt of a people, then would it not equally follow that populations could be bombed if their military command felt in some way the need of creating or adding to an unjust war? Finally, Merton directs his attention to decisions made by local churches and the people of said nations in the past deciding whether to cooperate in a war or not: "... Theirs not to reason why. The government knows best. They did not have to inquire too minutely into the cause of war or into the ways by which it was being waged. Suffice it that the bishops by their approval implied that the war and everything about it was just and the bishops in their turn, as good patriots, left all these technicalities to the ministry of war." (p. 195) But, does not an ordinary person untrained in the subtleties of ethical theory rightfully presume that the authorities should have any benefit of the doubt as to the moral uprightness of a war? In such a morass of factors, some of which are totally unknown in order to make a " decision of conscience," how can a philosophically trained individual come to a " certain " conclusion that a war is just or not, if some of the circumstances are totally unknowable unless he is in authority? And does it follow that, if a war is accepted as basically just, all actions necessarily connected with it are judged to be morally good and upright? And does silence on the part of bishops necessarily entail approval for some actions of a war? I simply refuse to believe that the book of Merton adequately reflects traditional Christian teaching and practice about faith and violence in a perceptively clear manner. Rather, he raises much confusion by his uncritical acceptance of popular theological opinion regarding the Vietnam war, government, black power and the so-called " establishment." BAsiL CoLE, 0. P. Newman CenteJr Kentfield, California Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment. Compiled and edited by EDwARD H. MADDEN, RoLLo HANDY and MARVIN FARBER. Charles C. Thomas: Springfield, Illinois, 1968. Pp. 150. The problem of punishment presents one of the most baffling aspects of ethical theory, and it is assuredly one of the most intractable elements in penal practice. It can hardly be said that this book, containing as it does the proceedings of a Symposium on Punishment held at the State University of New York at Buffalo, adds greatly to the understanding of the problem or to the resolution of its dilemmas. The four major BOOK REVIEWS ~01 addresses-" Philosophy and Wisdom in Punishment and Reward," by Professor C. J. Ducasse; "Immorality, Crime and Treatment," by Professor Charles A. Baylis; " Retribution Revisited," by Professor Bland Blanshard, and " The Contribution of Beccaria, Hegel, Holbach and Livingston to the General Theory of Criminal Responsibility," by Professor Mitchell Franklin -for the most part cover familiar territory, and the commentaries by a variety of philosophers, psychiatrists, social scientists and lawyers reflect very accurately the reactions that can be expected from their respective disciplines. But for the non-specialist, the collection is a convenient source for ascertaining academic opinion on such matters as the grounds of ethical judgment, the distinction between sin and crime, the ambiguities of retributive views, the bases of penal treatment and the limits of the law. It provides besides, a fascinating revelation of the relativity of contemporary moral attitudes. The Symposium does, of course, raise some fundamental issues, and, unlike many that occupy the professional moral philosopher, they are ones that directly affect the good of the community. It is significant that retribution occupies so prominent a place in the discussion, and Professor Blanshard's paper gives a reasonably argued account of the social sanctions that, properly understood, it should embody. The social scientists and psychiatrists are, as might be expected, more than ready to substitute treatment as an alternative to punishment, and exhibit some naivete in supposing that the causes of crime can so readily be identified with exclusively social and psychological factors. Professor Blanshard does well to remind them that, " under the influence of physical science, we are coming to regard behavior as...