Moral Reasoning by R. W. Beardsmore (review)

152 BOOK REVIEWS Some reservations, however, must be made. In the first place, the author does not analyze or critically justify the realism which he assumes. He does not indicate the necessary order in our primitive concepts and judgments through which we know that something exists with its own real or natural being distinct from our knowledge of it. This analysis was made by St. Thomas both in the Summa Theologiae (I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4) and elsewhere, and indeed was one of his great achievements. Moreover, one might object to the way in which the author contrasts the objects of conceptualization and of judgment and the way he relates these different acts. The intellect can conceive a thing and its existence separately, but this does not seem to be the usual way of conceiving. Ordinarily we must know that something exists before we can know what it is, and some primitive apprehensions must precede judgment, which is made by combining or dividing concepts in the light of the objects known. It would seem that apprehension must attain existence in some way, even if not distinctly or explicitly, and once explicitly known through judgment this knowledge can be included in the concept of the thing at least implicitly. In a word, to empty all concepts of existential import seems highly artificial , if indeed it is at all possible. Furthermore, the author does not interpret the main line of Aristotle's thought as does St. Thomas, who explained Aristotle's doctrine of form, not as a being or a whole but as a part and a cause of being, always dependent upon a first cause which imparts not only motion but also being even to eternal and incorruptible things. Aquinas Institute, School of Philo~'ophy River Forest, IU. WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P. Moral Reasoning. By R. W. BEARDSMORE. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. Pp. 143. $4.95. R. W. Beardsmore, of the University College of North Wales, Bangor, has provided us with an essay on moral reasoning and moral arguments that is simultaneously fascinating and frustrating. It is fascinating both because Beardsmore's critique of the positions taken by R. M. Hare and Mrs. Foot is so telling and instructive and because much that he has to say positively about the nature of moral reasoning makes such good sense. It is frustrating because, after one has finished and begun to reflect on Beardsmore's own position, one is suddenly aware that the position set forth, although plausible in many respects, is ultimately a linguistic game that simply fails to come to grips with the issues. BOOK REVIEWS 153 Beardsmore's essay is intended to show (l) that the two principal accounts today of the nature of moral reasoning-in his view those represented by R. M. Hare and Mrs. Patricia Foot-are erroneous and (~) that an alternate account, one proposed in the course of the essay by the author, is more plausible. Hare maintains that moral judgments have no subject-matter proper to themselves and that a moral judgment is such not because of what is said but because of the way it is said. According to Hare, a moral judgment makes sense if it follows as a logical conclusion from a syllogism whose major premise states a principle of conduct and whose minor premise is a statement of fact. On this view moral evaluations, although based on factual statements, are not reducible to facts but consist of facts plus an added ingredient-an evaluative judgment that can serve as the major premise in a moral argument. For instance, Hare argues as follows: One ought never to say what is false; but X is false; therefore one ought not to say X. Among the objections that Beardsmore poses to Hare's position is that it logically entails the absurd consequence that anything can count as a moral reason, provided that it is possible to devise an appropriate major premise. Thus, according to Beardsmore, one could legitimately argue, if Hare is correct in his evaluation of the nature of moral reasoning, as follows: One ought always to hit one's brother-in-law on Tuesdays; today is Tuesday; therefore...