An Interpretation of Existence by Joseph Owens (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 151 An Interpretation of Existence. By JosEPH OwENs. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 160. This interpretation of existence follows familiar Thomistic lines but is not mere repetition. It is set forth in the context of the historical background and the pluralistic currents of contemporary thought. The author remarks that genuine philosophy must be creative, not, indeed, a creation out of nothing but a creative evolution which is the continuing of a developmental process and the growth of insights marking the progress of human understanding. " A Thomism that is narrowly ' Thomistic ' cannot hope to be a genuine Thomism." (p. 147) The present work is refreshingly open to the interests of philosophers not only of the West but in this ecumenical age hopefully also of the East. The problem of existence arises from the fact that, although the existence of things is admittedly known, the interpretation of this fact is by no means easily achieved or agreed upon. Is the existence of things a mere historical event which can be passed over as philosophically trivial, or is it pregnant with the most far-reaching and all-important of philosophical consequences? The answer, we are told, depends upon how existence is grasped and conceived. Our original grasp of the existence of things is not attained in any concept, because concepts do not have existential content. Conceptually, one hundred dollars are the same, whether the dollars exist or not. By intellect we can consider the thing and the existence separately, and the concepts themselves even in combination, such as a real mountain of gold, do not express the fact that something exists. It is not in the act of mere conceiving but in the act of judging that we grasp the existence of things in such a way as to know that something exists. Conceptualization and judgment always accompany each other, but they are two different kinds of intellectual activity, each with its own object. Judgment is a dynamic and synthesizing activity, and it is conditioned by time. Existence as the object of judgment is also a synthesizing, dynamic and temporally conditioned actuality. There are two ways or levels of existence, real and cognitional, and these are known by different judgments. Existence as first known by judgment is analyzed and interpreted so as to set forth the high points of realistic metaphysics in a way that is, for the most part, clear and convincing. This is a work which merits and will well repay careful study. In striking ways it brings out the cardinal position that our knowledge of existence is attained through judgment, not through mere apprehension. The analysis of existence as first grasped through judgment is pursued to the source of existence in an efficient cause which is itself subsistent existence, and from this principle synthetic consequences of vital importance are drawn concerning the imparting of existence to created things, particularly in regard to human freedom and the human soul. 152 BOOK REVIEWS Some reservations, however, must be made. In the first place, the author does not analyze or critically justify the realism which he assumes. He does not indicate the necessary order in our primitive concepts and judgments through which we know that something exists with its own real or natural being distinct from our knowledge of it. This analysis was made by St. Thomas both in the Summa Theologiae (I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4) and elsewhere, and indeed was one of his great achievements. Moreover, one might object to the way in which the author contrasts the objects of conceptualization and of judgment and the way he relates these different acts. The intellect can conceive a thing and its existence separately, but this does not seem to be the usual way of conceiving. Ordinarily we must know that something exists before we can know what it is, and some primitive apprehensions must precede judgment, which is made by combining or dividing concepts in the light of the objects known. It would seem that apprehension must attain existence in some way, even if not distinctly or explicitly, and once explicitly known through judgment this knowledge can be included in the concept of the thing at...