Existentialism: Greek Ethics and the Way Back to the Future: A Note

EXISTENTIALISM: GREEK ETHICS AND THE WAY BACK TO THE FUTURE: A NOTE FOR ANY READER of Kierkegaard, it is a well-known fact that existentialism considers Socrates as its model. It is true that, in the Philosophical ragments, Kierkegaard goes " beyond Socrates " in developing a more radical view of truth and of learning, but still it is Socrates who is taken as the source of inspiration. We can observe this same phenomenon of the return to Greek ethics in the use which both Sartre and Camus make of classical tragedy. Again, their existential rendering of the ancient tragedies makes each one more radical than its earlier Greek version. Yet, the amazing thing to note is the sympathy which the existentialists feel for Greek ethical themes in spite of the intervening centuries and all of their polemic against " historical understanding." Existentialism is anti-evolutionary where man is concerned and thus can feel itself immediately contemporary with classical man. All men share the same human condition regardless of time, although the Greeks seem to have caught the tragical flavor better than many other eras of the past. However, my interest now is neither to explore this relationship between Greek ethics and existentialism nor to comment on the views of man which they share in common. Since existentialism is future oriented and anti-historical in its outlook , it would be more true to its spirit to turn this brief exploration toward the future and not the past. In any strict sense, existentialism's interest in classical ethics was not historical ; it was simply inspirational. That is, existentialism drew from these ancient figures both its inspiration and the basis upon which it could extend its own analysis. Thus, what we want to ask now is how the combination of both existentialism 806 EXISTENTIALISM 807 arid Greek ethics might point out for us " the way to the future." Existentialism, no less than ancient philosophy, now belongs to another age, but both still can provide a ground for the " way back to the future." Specifically, what I want to try to do is to extend a very brief parallel to an argument which I have developed more fully in another connection.1 That is, if existentialism can and has provided a basis upon which metaphysics may be built, and if it has done this by establishing the empirical foundation for metaphysics which Kant demanded, what can existentialism provide for the revival of a classical ethical perspective? To suggest this may seem strange, since modem ethics is perhaps most closely associated with " subjectivism" and " relativism ," and these themes seem both opposed to classical "objective" ethics and also actually to be what existentialism endorses. Again, what I want to ask is not so much whether existentialism was or is itself " subjective " but whether in fact its explorations in psychology and literature can actually provide us with a ground for a return to something like a classical ethical perspective. Do we once again have available a common model for all men and a universal standard for judgment? Perhaps the best way to approach this problem is to consider the distinction which is often drawn and which is so fundamental to existentialism: that is, we do not have a universal human nature given to us as an essence in advance, but we do all exist as men in a common human condition. Classical ethics would seem to depend for its objectivity on our ability to discover a universally shared human nature. Therefore, to deny this would put Athens ethically at a great distance from Copenhagen and Paris and also doom existentialism to some form of subjectivism in ethics. However, let us explore a little what kind of common human condition existentialism thinks we share and then see whether in fact this can enable us, not to go back to Greek ethics but to move forward to revive a 1 See my The Exi:Jtentialist Prolegomena: To A Future Metaphyaic8, University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1969. FREDEIUCK SONTAG siillilar ethical perspective in the future. If our human cr:mdition is the same, although our essence develops differently and oontingently, can this 3erve as the basis for an objective norm? " Fate " is...