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19! BOOK REVIEWS of the legislator. A somewhat attentive reading of the tract on prudence in the Summa Theologiae, clarified in case of need by the excellent commentary which Pere Deman has given in the French translation published by the Revue des Jeunes, suffices for arriving at an undersanding of the importance of this mode of truth, and that it corresponds exactly to the existential truth whose necessity contemporary philosophy has so correctly underlined. Theological rationalism in general, but also voluntarism, to which the advent of legalism in moral corresponds, allowed us to forget the existence of the veritas vitae, its specific character, its indispensable role in the constitution of a human being authentically oriented to the last end. But it is also the notion of orientation to the final end which would have to be recaptured in order to rid it of so many erroneous interpretations of which it has been and of which it continues to be the object. In any case, it is to the ensemble: speculative truth and practical truth, that our contemporary problem of philosophic truth must be brought back. Many perspectives would be modified by it. Mr. Holmes invites us to reflect on the synthesis of different forms of truth in their unity with a view to defining the status of Christian philosophy . I would wish that, after this work whose aim seems to have been above all to clear the ground, he will give us the positive contribution for which the present work gives us hope. L. B. GEIGER, 0. P. Albertinum Fribourg, Switzerland Language and Illumination. Studies in the History of Philosophy. By S. MoRRIS ENGEL. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. Pp. 150. 19.80 guilders. Even though all these essays have appeared at least once before in print, it is useful to have them drawn together here, mainly because Dr. Engel has a somewhat off-beat approach that deserves the reinforcement that this book affords. He characteristically brings his scholarship in the literature of the history of western philosophy into contact with current interests among philosophers of language. Thus in contrast to the frequently ahistorical bias of many linguistic philosophers today, his studies add a sense of depth-and challenge-to contemporary concerns. The " illumination " of the title works in both directions, I think: from present to past and from past to present. The first two essays, for example, on the linguistic theories of Hobbes and Locke, respectively, assume the standpoint of modern interests and techniques. Hobbes's credentials as semantical analyst are considered and found not, after all, to be so im- BOOK REVIEWS 193 pressive as some current thinkers suppose. Engel argues that Hobbes was less interested in dispassionate logical analysis than in the substantive defense of his philosophical position. Locke, in contrast, is defended as much more sophisticated-if the whole context of his discussion of language is considered-than modern conceptual analysts normally notice. In the other direction, from past to present, Engel raises pertinent questions about the adequacy of current linguistic philosophy on the strength of stubborn historical facts that fail to fit modern doctrines. His study entitled "Isomorphism and Linguistic Waste," to choose the best example, challenges the widely accepted view that " category-mistakes " and " systematically misleading expressions" (to use two of Gilbert Ryle's famous formulations) are in fact philosophically fruitless and damaging. Engel argues, on the contrary, that philosophical illumination has frequently come from speaking of one subject matter in terms of another, something he terms " isomorphism," and that such attempts " to throw light upon two ostensibly different phenomena by revealing the common logical structure of both" (p. 41) have often been quite deliberate rather than due merely to the insidious power of language to bemuse. His bold example, for this study, is Schopenhauer. Engel stresses here that, rightly or wrongly in specific cases, one of the prime (and proper) functions of philosophy is the " attempt to lead us to see similarities where our ordinary language tends to hide them from us or is as yet incapable of embracing them." (p. 48) Ryle's identification of such a function as mere linguistic mystification, therefore, is in reality a rejection of (or a failure...

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