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NEO-DARWINIAN REACTIONS TO THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DARWIN'S NOMINALISM IN OUR TWO previous articles in The Thomist 1 some of the pros and cons concerning Darwin's special theory of evolution were considered. Indeed, scientists today are still debating whether evolutions or revolutions dominate in the production of natural changes. Statements such as the following seem to allow much room for either or both: " Evolution implies directed change. There is not and never has been, in neo-Darwinian thought, any quibble about the fact that change must come from random mutation at the molecular level. ... We do not regard perpetuation of neutral mutations as being evolution per se, but merely the pool from which evolution can occur, given a directed push by natural selection ." 2 Underlying the above statement is a whole new perspective on Darwin's original hypothesis. Much of the newer viewpoint has come about through both the introduction of new data and the need to " humanize " the original Darwin. Here we will be concerned with the latter. 1. The Problem Inherited From Darwin. Along with the many new directions Darwin's works have given to modern biology there have also passed into our century several problems initiated , or at least made prominent, by the writings of the Englishman. One such problem, perhaps the most widely discussed in one way or another, is generally referred to as the problem of social Darwinism. This problem came to widespread popular attention directly as the result of Darwin's espousal of a certain epistemological position which he claimed, 1 The Thomist, XXXlli (1969), "Darwin on Evolution: A Re-Estimation," pp. 456-496; " Evolution After Darwin," pp. 718-786. • From a letter to the editor, Science (August 1, 1969), p. 448. 113 114 F. F. CENTORE without himself ever realizing its full philosophical history and import, was a necessary presupposition for the acceptance of his special theory of evolution. The particular epistemological position he espoused was one of the classical answers to the so-called problem of universal predication.3 2. The Problem of Universals. Perhaps the best way to put the problem is in the form of a question: How is it possible for one and the same term to apply equally well to many obviously different concrete entities? Or how is it possible to ever, at any time, use terms univocally? The use of univocal language is, of course, absolutely necessary to the sciences of logic and mathematics. And, insofar as the reasoning in any science is to be carried on logically or is to employ mathematics, that science also depends upon univocal language. The fact of universal predication, then, is common to all the sciences and is the beginning of the problem of universals quoad nos.4 How, for example, can one say that Tom is a human being, Mary is a human being, etc., and understand human being in • Darwin's nominalism is quite well known among outstanding modem biologists. E. Mayr, for example, states that the modern, synthetic theory of evolution depended for its growth upon mainly " the rejection of two basic philosophical concepts that were formerly widespread if not universally held: preformism and typological thinking." (Animal Species and Evolution, Cambridge, Mass. [1963], p. 4.) Although Mayr is historically inaccurate on at least two points (preformism was held as a scientific doctrine; nominalistic positions were quite widespread, especially in England), his recognition of the importance of typological thinking in holding back slow change theories is accurate. • The question of whether or not universals exist, and if so how and where, is a later issue, one which arises in the process of attempting to solve the initial problem. The initial, logical, problem: How can we predicate univocally? The answer is that the subjects are identical in that respect. The metaphysical problem: How is such a thing possible or what is the nature of a class? Answer: An archetype in God; an individual essence in the thing; a concept in the human knower. Of course, many biologists find such an answer unscientific. R. Munson, for example, who wants more morphology in taxonomy, is as much a positivist in this regard as is, for instance, H. Lehman, who...

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