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324 BOOK REVIEWS ical extremes together in a higher unity." The book culminates with an analysis of this unifying school, represented by Spranger and Litt, Leo Gabriel and Max MUller, Nicolai Hartman and Rintelen himself. The latter holds " that the order of values reveals a dynamic, vertical ' upward ' axis-of-meaning (Sinnachse) in which, however, the horizontal value form which is valid in this actuation should not be lost sight of." More of his realistic analysis of values can be found in Rintelen's article in International Philosophical Quarterly (vol. 4, 1964). This is a well-informed, communicative, and generous-spirited invitation to the study of present forms of German philosophy. With its help, one can gain an initial orientation and can also appreciate why the questions of meaning, being, and human cultural unification are so central. With his brief mention of Ernst Bloch and Viktor Frankl, Rintelen leaves us with an opening toward other tendencies as well. JAMES CoLLINS Saint Louis University Saint Louis, Missouri The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. Delos. Edited by ALBERT BRODERICK. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 395. $15.00. The procedural framework of the legal system occupies a central position in recent studies of contemporary jurisprudence and the comparative philosophy of law. The processes of law, as Paul Freund recently remarked, rather than its particular judgments or results, offer insights which "may teach us to cope with the great antinomies of our aspirations: liberty and order; privacy and knowledge; stability and change; security and responsibility."1 The legal enterprise, defined in Henry M. Hart's studies around the principle of institutionalized decision and settlement, is a creative force in society. Law serves persons in radical interdependence by procedures to duly direct and domesticate power. The legal order is a positive context for the developing interrelationships of rights and duties between individuals and organizations within the national state and the international community. Focusing upon the centrality of a progressive and societal role of law jurists are increasingly turning from treatises preoccupied with systematic 1 On Law and Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1969), p. v. BOOK REVIEWS 825 conceptualization and codification to a methodology of interdisciplinary analysis. Illustrative of this trend are the recent studies of Freund, Lon L. Fuller's The Anatomy of Law, and two very significant studies of the judicial process, Alexander Bickel's The Supreme Court and the Idea of Justice and Schubert and Danelski's Comparative Judicial Behavior: CrossCultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West. The present collection of essays taken from the writings of Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard and Joseph T. Delos brings welcome light upon the American scene. Careful editing and meticulous annotation make this volume a valuable contribution to the analytic endeavor. An equally worthy translation serves to convey with clarity and precision the thinking of the great French jurists as they explored the dynamics of social interaction to establish law and right upon the institutional foundations of society. Roscoe Pound classified the work of Maurice Hauriou, Dean of the Faculte de Droit of Toulouse in the first quarter of the century, as neo-scholastic sociological jurisprudence. What Kant attributed in the development of legal obligation to will, Marx to economic wants, Post to instincts, Weber to values, and William James to desires and demands in conflict, Pound says Hauriou ascribed to institutions.2 Pound found this a dangerous shift of the basic legal unit away from the individual man. He feared submergence in the demands of the corporate state. Yet it is now clear that Hauriou compensated by a rich personalism which enabled him to strike a theoretical balance that Pound had failed to see. Hauriou sought an explanation for the developing legal order that would avoid both an individualistic disintegration in the fictionalized citadel of contract and the denigration of legal personality by the equation of legal order with the state. For this reason he repeatedly criticized Leon Duguit, who he thought had used sociological theory in such a way as to jeopardize the very integrity of personal rights as a creation of the mass of consciences. This he thought would leave unprotected the rights of...

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