The Universal Treatise of Nicholas of Autrecourt by Leonard A. Kennedy, C. S. B., Richard E. Arnold, S. J., Arthur E. Millward (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 703 The Universal Treatise of Nicholas of Autrecourt. Translated by LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C. S. B., RicHARD E. ARNOLD, S. J., and ARTHUR E. MILLWARD, with an introduction by Leonard A. Kennedy, C. S. B. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971. Pp. 1792. $3.00. This is a translation of the only major work of Nicholas known to be extant and hitherto known to most scholars as the Exigit or Exigit ordo because of its incipit. It will fill an important gap in medieval philosophy for those who want to investigate the celebrated " medieval Hume " but are unable to deal with the Latin text. This seems to me a very good translation. However like Hume Nicholas may be in epistemology, he is assuredly not to be compared for clarity of expression. Nicholas's way of expressing himself is often elliptical and very obscure, and it seems important that the resultant uncertainty as to his meaning be accurately preserved in a responsible translation. The present work meets that standard well. By unscrambling Nicholas's syntax and filling out his often incomplete way of expressing himself, the translators have maximized intelligibility, while restraining any impulse to force an interpretation on the text. Father Kennedy's introduction is a brief summary of Nicholas's life and work, followed by a summary presentation of the main line of argument in the work. It is competent and accurate, though the orderly arrangement of the text and the use of subtitles largely obviates the need for such a review. Using this edition, contemporary analytic philosophers with a penchant for resurrecting things medieval should have a field day, since the work is filled with controversial and somewhat unclear and ambiguous arguments. But, for the historian of philosophy, the primary value of the work is as a document in fourteenth-century thought. And as such it is an extremely difficult one to understand. In his introduction Father Kennedy writes that the treatise " has as its intention tc call university professors, especially at Paris, to the study of Christianity and ethics. The means to achieve the end is the discrediting of Aristotle and his disciple Averroes (11Q6-1198), the study of whose writings occupied most of the time of these professors." As a statement of Nicholas's avowed intention, this is correct. But there still seems to me real doubt as to whether Nicholas is to be believed. Perhaps I can state briefly some of the sources of my confusion. Nicholas claims to be calling for a return to the study of higher things by showing that there are metaphysical and epistemological positions that are more probable than those of Aristotle and Averroes. Of course, he tells us, many of these positions are in conflict with truths of the Faith, but he insists he wants only to argue that they are probable, not that they are true. First of all, on the face of it, this sounds very suspicious as a declaration of program. It seems at least odd to try to call men to a study of Christianity by establishing a host of heretical opinions as more probable than the 704 BOOK REVIEWS opinions of the Church. But there is another consideration that is even more perplexing. If we are to believe Nicholas's statement of intent, then we must take seriously his claim to be developing a philosophy that is highly probable, at least more plausible than Aristotle's. And yet it seems very clear that no such claim can be supported. Weinberg's study of Nicholas has shown that, while the metaphysics he develops is daring, it is markedly unconvincing. The entire structure rests on a principle of the maximal goodness of the world which is scarcely supported at all. His arguments for the eternity of things and for atomism both seem weak. His discussion of the continuum is confused; his argument rejecting motion is unsound. And so on. On this basis alone it might be supposed that Nicholas is serious in his project but is simply unsuccessful. However, what gives pause before so concluding is that Nicholas's work in the theory of knowledge is extremely powerful and imaginative, in both its critical and...