Is Philosophy Still Possible?

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. ~0017 VoL. XXXVI OCTOBER, 1972 No.4 IS PHILOSOPHY STILL POSSIBLE? PLATO'S REPUBLIC (470E, 499C-D) describes a, small Greek city implacably hostile to all non-Greeks whom it calls barbarians. Since Socrates admits the possibility of philosopher-kings among barbarians, his utopia might find itself killing some of the wise men who alone should rule it. The only regime able to avoid this waste of rare managerial talent would seem to be a communist world-state in which the wise have complete control, assigning to everybody what he deserves and what is good for him. Socrates nowhere explicitly defends his preference for a tiny Greek aristocratic utopia. The present study attempts to show that this preference arises from awareness of a theological-political problem always central to philosophy, but most apparent in Greek philosophy and, especially , in Socrates or Plato. Awareness of this problem discourages the full success of either modernity's global moral orientation or antiquity's tribal or civic piety. Thus Plato's This article was begun under a research grant from the Henry Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom in the Modern World and completed under a research grant from Ford Foundation funds administered by Scripps College. 545 546 HARRY NEUMANN philosopher-kings rule their small polity m virtue of their knowledge of a global or cosmic justice which seems more appropriate to a global regime. Would not the civic religion of Athens or Sparta fit better with the political limitations of Plato's utopia? Considerations of this sort lead modern critics to deplore Plato's inability to liberate his global or cosmic sympathies from the political prejudices of his age. This essay contends that the prejudice is with the critics and not Plato whose inability or unwillingness to wholly transcend his city's gods springs from awareness of an ignorance native to philosophy . Philosophic ignorance arises from the belief that one lacks an adequate answer to the question of how (or whether) to live. Serious entertaining of this belief was precluded in ancient tribes or cities by unquestioning reverence for the gods, the ultimate moral authorities, of one's community. Fear of the Lord (or Lords) presented itself as the beginning of wisdom. Any activity-from carpentry to science-which did not arise from this pious origin could not lead to wisdom. At best it would be foolishness; at worst, it was abhorred as a blasphemous enterprise fated to deprive the tribe or city of its most important allies, its gods (or god) . Philosophers are unlikely to refute this charge adequately, so long as they remain convinced that they lack wisdom and that its attainment probably is impossible. How can men who believe themselves ignorant of how to live seriously challenge their city's moral orthodoxies? More importantly, how can they challenge these authorities in their own soul? For they, as it were, imbibed their society's authoritative morality with their mother's milk. All important institutions and sentiments fostered in their community strengthen this overwhelming compulsion. Consequently, philosophy's case appears weak and problematic not only to its pious opponents but, especially, to itself. Since nobody is born philosophic, philosophy's emergence and survival require appeasement of the apparently omnipotent passions encouraged in the soul by the morality dominant in the philosopher's IS PHILOSOPHY STILL POSSIBLE? 547 community. Those sovereign passions vary from community to community; the gods of Lycurgus or Manu are hostile to each other and to the God of Moses. Yet all prephilosophic regimes share the conviction that fear of their gods (or god) is the sole beginning of wisdom. Thus nothing seemed more insane than the philosopher's belief that he (and his fellow citizens) lack an adequate answer to the question of the good life. Obviously, obedience to the laws revealed by the city's gods constitutes the good life. No wonder that Socrates' questions about how (or whether) to live seemed futile or perverse to pious Athenians! Socrates was not condemned for his wisdom but for the...