Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 175 and deontic logical systems. His examples, showing how these systems can assist philosophers laboring in the areas of cognition and ethics, are most helpful critically. To this reviewer Dr. Purtill's Logic for Philosophers is a good textbook because his primary purpose in writing it was satisfactorily fullliled: "We are acquiring logical techniques so as to be able to apply them to interesting philosophical problems." (p. 8~4) Besides, he is sober in his expectations of the analytical potential of logical techniques: "there are a good many philosophical arguments which cannot usefully be analyzed by the techniques of formal logic and, therefore, not by the techniques which you have learned from this book." (p. 848) Despite the many praiseworthy aspects of this book, however, the plethora of typographical errors were lamentable, especially those that may have been somewhat substantive to the understanding of a technique. But, perhaps, the publishers realizing the importance of this book will be more careful in the next edition. Providence College Providence, R.I. DENNIS c. KANE, 0. P. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, translated by F. R. LARCHER, 0. P., with a preface by J. A. Weisheipl, 0. P. Albany: Magi Books, Inc., 1970. Pp. ~5~. $6.50. This version of Aquinas's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle has been prepared by Fr. Larcher, an able and skilled translator of medieval Latin, and it is a welcome alternative to the earlier translation of his erstwhile collaborator, Fr. Pierre Conway, 0. P. (Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, Quebec: La Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, 1956.) Since Fr. Conway's work appeared fifteen years ago, and then only in mimeographed form, Fr. Larcher's becomes the first English translation of this important logical treatise to appear in type and in durable binding, and hopefully it will now find its way onto many library shelves. While preserving Fr. Conway's literal style, Fr. Larcher has inclined somewhat further to the modern idiom and is more readable on this account. He is accurate in his interpretation of the text, in all but a few instances rendering Aquinas's thought with great fidelity. This reviewer thus has no hesitancy in recommending the translation to those who know no Latin themselves, and so are completely dependent on the translator for their understanding of St. Thomas's thought. Some idea of the style of translation and its difference from the earlier 176 BOOK REVIEWS version may be seen in the following brief excerpts from St. Thomas's commentary on Book II, chap. 1: LABOBER He says therefore first that the number of questions is equal to the number of things that are scientifically known. The reason for this is that science is knowledge acquired through demonstration . But things which we previously did not know are those of which we must seek knowledge by demonstration: for it is in regard to things which we do not know that we form questions. Hence it follows that the things we inquire about are equal in number to the things we know through science. But there are four things that we ask, namely, quia [i.e., is it a fact that], propter quid [i.e., why, or what is the cause or reason], si est [if it is, i. e., whether it is], quid est [what is it]. To these four can be reduced whatever is scientifically inquirable or knowable. [pp. 168-164] CoNWAY He says therefore first that the number of questions is equal to the number of things which are known scientifically. The reason for this is that science is knowledge acquired through demonstration . But we must acquire the knowledge by demonstration of those things which were unknown before, and we ask questions concerning those things which we ignore. Whence it follows that the things which are sought are equal in number to those things which are known scientifically. But there are four things which are sought, i. e., quia, propter quid, si est and quid est (that it is, why it is, if it is, and what it is): to which four may be reduced whatever is seekable or knowable scientifically. [pp. 291...