The Problem of the Criterion by Roderick M. Chisolm (review)

988 BOOK REVIEWS The Problem of the Criterion. ByRoDERICK M. CHISOLM. Milwaukee: The Marquette University Press, 1974. Pp. 4Q. $Q.50. In the history of Western philosophy the problem of the criterion-i. e., how we distinguish our true ideas from our false ones-has functioned as the fundamental problem for many philosophers. More especially, it has dominated the history of epistemology since the time of Descartes. In fact, since the Meditations and the Discourse on Method, much epistemology has been regarded as almost co-extensive with the problem of the criterion. It is to this issue that Professor Roderick M. Chisholmn directed his 1973 "Aquinas Lecture," The Problem of the Crite1·ion. Chisholm himself regards this issue as a fundamental problem: The problem of the criterion seems to me to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. I am tempted to say that one has not begun to philosophise until one has faced this problem and has recognized how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is. (p. 1) Pushed to its Cartesian extreme, however, I suspect that this problem is fundamentally non-Aristotelian. I grant, however, that the "Transcendental Thomists " influenced by Kant have been tremendously concerned with the problem of the criterion. I will note later in this review that Chisholm appears to resurrect an essentially Aristotelian position. I su,;gest , in fact, that scholastic philosophers who read Chisholm's text closely will find many congenial themes. The overt thrust of the text is realist, empirical yet non-Humean, and thoroughly non-sceptical. Interestingly enough, Chisholm remarks that what first set him thinking about the problem of the criterion-and he admits being " obsessed by it "-were two treatises of scholastic philosophy, P. Coffey's Epistemology and Cardinal Mercier's Criteriologie generale ou theorie generale de la certitude. Chisholm notes that Coffey and Mercier have " set the problem correctly" and have " seen what is necessary for its solution." As he proceeds, Chisholm uses Coffey and Mercier more as " touch-stones " for delineating the problem rather than philosophers providing a solution to the problem. Nevertheless, Chisholm's own elucidation of the problem anJ proposal for a solution have strong Aristotelian elements. The question which gets philosophers involved with the problem of the criterion is "What can I really know about the world? " Put differently, how are we to decide, in any given case, whether we have a genuine piece of knowledge? Or again, how are we to distinguish the real cases of knowledge from what only seem to be cases of knowledge? That this problem is couched in Cartesian worries should be obvious. What precisely does Chisholm understand by the problem and why is it so fundamental a problem for him? It is philosophically problematic BOOK REVIEWS 989 because a proposed solution often leads into a vicious circle. And the vicious circle pushes the epistemologist into Scepticism. Chisholm paraphrases Montaigne's formulation of this puzzle. In order to know if our ideas really correspond to things-which is, in effect, the old philosophical chestnut of Representative Realism as elucidated by Locke and Descarteswe need a procedure for distinguishing ideas (or appearances) that are tru~ from ideas (or appearances) that are false. But in order to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we must know if it really succeeds in distinguishing ideas (or appearances) that are true from ideas (or ap·· pearances) which are false. However-and here is where the circle becomes vicious-we cannot know whether the procedure really does succeed unless we already know which idea (or appearance) is true and which is false. Therefore, we are caught in a vicious circle. Yet, as with most philosophical paradoxes, a few precise distinctions can go a long way to clear the muddle. This is precisely what Chisholm does. Chisholm formulates the philosophical issues involved in the problem of the criterion by distinguishing two pairs of questions. These questions are used throughout the book: A. What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? B. How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge? Chisholm remarks...