Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom by Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 681 Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom. By Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Pp. ~40. $7.95 cloth, $~.95 paper. Grisez and Shaw state quite plainly in the Introduction to their book that this volume on ethics is not a technical work of philosophy; rather, "the primary audience is the college ethics class." The book is divided into twenty short chapters on relevant moral issues, and at the end of each of these chapters is a list of thought-provoking questions for review and discussion. Due to the fact that the authors do not explicitly address themselves either to the tenets of traditional morality or to the methodological issues of the new morality, it appears that they are presuming that the reader either has some prior knowledge of what these moralities are, or he will be able to rely upon a teacher to supplement the book's presentation. Nowhere do they make specific reference to the proponents of either the traditional or the situational approaches to ethical decision making. Thus, it seems that the authors' principal aim is not to defend or to attack positions , but rather it is to involve the reader in a synthesis of both approaches to ethics. The basic theme of the book revolves around discussing the three levels of freedom which are operative in man's moral life. For the authors, there is a corresponding level of action which is derived from each of these levels of freedom. The first level of freedom pertains to the lack of physical constraints or coercion. Physical freedom is not specifically human, since as the authors point out this kind of freedom is enjoyed typically by wild animals and can even apply to inanimate objects. At this level of freedom the action's meaning comes from its consummation. The second level of freedom is specifically human, and it is defined as " doing as one pleases," i.e., the absence of social demands and restrictions. This level of freedom seems to be identical with freedom of choice. Actions which are derived from this level receive their meaning from a specific goal the action is meant to achieve. Now, whereas the authors are concerned with these two levels of freedom mentioned above, their primary concern is with the level of freedom as self-determination. At this third level an action derives its meaning from a good in which one participates by performing the action. Based upon this contention the authors attempt to show that when man determines himself by participating in truly human goods he is acting responsibly for his own life and for the lives of others. In other words, the authors seek to prove that the problem concerning what it means to be a person is essentially the problem of self-determination. This fundamental problem of what it means to be a person (self-determination) is discussed from many different angles, e. g., from the perspectives of happiness, decision-making, the eight "modes of responsibility,'' etc. 682 BOOK REVIEWS For the teacher who would be disposed to use this valuable book in a college classroom, he should be well versed in both the traditional and situational approaches to ethics in order to answer intelligently the questions that could be posed by an inquiring student. In addition, the teacher should understand the distinction between freedom of choice and freedom as self-determination. The reason for this is because the authors are seemingly employing a distinction that has been developed in both humanistic psychology and theology (Josef Fuchs and Karl Rahner). Although I feel that this book is valuable for both college classrooms and discussion groups, I also feel that that it is not without flaw. The authors have repeatedly argued that morality is essentially concerned with how man chooses in his moral life. Whereas I am completely in agreement with their view, I do not believe that the authors have adequately demonstrated the interrelation between the three levels of freedom which they discuss. They consistently argue that it is precisely on the third level of freedom (self-determination) where man becomes truly responsible for himself and others. This...