Paul Tillich’s Arguments for God’s Reality

PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S REALITY IT IS INTERESTING to notice that, although he vehemently denies that the question of God's existence is a legitimate question, Paul Tillich does have arguments for God's "reality." Tillich, of course, does not use the term "reality" here, but there must be some term to denote God's ontological status in Tillich's system. When Tillich speaks of something that " exists," he means something which is finite, is limited by the "categories of finitude" (time, space, substance , etc.) . God, Tillich says, is most assuredly not this. God, he says, is being-itself. The purpose of this article is to show that such a ploy does not succeed for Tillich. Indeed, one can raise the question of the reality of being-itself. In fact, Tillich himself raises this question and gives at least two arguments to prove the reality of his God. The notion of non-being plays a central role for Tillich here. Hence, in this essay I shall explicate Tillich's notion of non-being as an ontological power/ and examine his arguments for God's reality. In so doing I hope to show two things: (1) that Tillich does offer arguments for God's reality; (~) that those arguments are not sound. The notion of non-being, says Tillich, has a long history in philosophy, beginning with Parrnenides and continuing to Sartre and Heidegger." There have, however, been two basic ways to try to avoid this notion. 1 Though Tillich mentions non-being in many places, the major sources for his views on it are as follows: Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 186-189; The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 32-63; Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 35-53. 2 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 33. Here Tillich lists the major philosophical figures who have made use of the concept of non-being and states briefly the way he thinks the notion functioned in their thought. 309 310 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD (1) Some philosophers, says Tillich, try to discard nonbeing as an ontological notion by saying that negativity is only a quality of negative judgments.8 Tillich's argument against this view 4 is that negative judgments themselves presuppose a being (man) who can transcend the present moment by expectations and then be disappointed when the events which would fulfill those expectations do not occur. The judgment made by that being, then, was mistaken. The important thing to see, though, says Tillich, is that expectation itself would not be possible unless being were structured in such a way as to allow man to have expectations and fall into error. For this to be possible, man himself " must be separated from his being in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange and questionable." 5 Further, this separation is itself possible only because man participates in the ontological ground of negativity, non-being. Thus, Tillich concludes, negative judgments themselves presuppose non-being. (~) The second way to attempt to avoid non-being is by placing it in absolute contrast with being.6 If non-being is in no way related to being then non-being is not. This was Parmenides ' move. The answer to this, says Tillich, is to speak of non-being as "dialectical," as related to being.7 Tillich distinguishes betwen two types of non-being by referring to the Greek distinction between meon and ouk on.8 M eon is dialectical non-being. In Platonism mean was " that which does not yet have being but can become being if it is united with essences or ideas." 9 It is the meontic "Matter" from which the demiurgos formed the world in Plato's Timaeus. Ouk on, on the other hand, is the " nothing which has no relation to being." 10 8 Tillich, Systematic Theolo,gy, I, p. 187. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. ss. • Ibid. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 34. • Ibid. • Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 254. • Ibid., pp. 254-255. • Ibid., p. 188. • Ibid., p. 187 10 lllid. PAUL TILLICH'S...