Bernard Lonergan on Value

BERNARD LONERGAN ON VALUE THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION to philoophical and theological thought that Bernard Lonergan as made over the last few decades has not gone unnoticed . Indeed, considerable attention has been paid over the years to his work in such areas as cognitional analysis, epistemology , philosophical theology, and, most recently, method in theology. Less consideration has been given to his contributions in the field of ethics. An important element in the development of Lonergan's ethical thought has been his reflections on value.1 Inasmuch as these reflections are at once not only strikingly original but also deeply rooted in the best of traditional and modern philosophical thought, they have the potential for making a major contribution to the task of clarifying the foundation for a contemporary ethic. However, because Lonergan's reflections on value have developed significantly over many years, and because they have not been presented as a whole in an explicit, systematic integration , their full potential has never been readily available. It is my intention in this brief article, then, to lay out in an explicit way the key elements and basic pattern of Lonergan's developing reflections on value. This article will not attempt to present a complete exposition of anything like "Lonergan's Theory of Value " ; rather, it will concentrate on two central issues in the development of Lonergan's reflections on this topic: first, the explicit introduction of a transcendental notion of value, and, .secondly, the relation of value and feelings. 1 This is most evident in the period beginning with Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957; designated below as Insight) and continuing up to the appearance of Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972; designated below as MT) . An important point in the course of this development is marked by The Subject (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968; designated below as Subject) • ~48 244 WALTER E. CONN I. Transcendental Notion of Value The fundamental difference in modes of intending, and thus also the principal division of sources of meaning, according to Lonergan, lies between the categorial and the transcendental.2 Categories are involved in asking determinate questions and giving determinate answers through experiencing, understanding , judging, deciding.3 Transcendentals, on the other hand, " are contained in questions prior to the answers," 4 they "ground questioning." 5 Transcendentals are, in fact, "the radical intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge. They are a priori because they go beyond what we know to seek what we do not know yet. They are unrestricted because answers are never complete and so only give rise to still further questions. They are comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole or totality of which our answers reveal only part." 6 Most importantly for our interests, however, " the transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection , and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for selftranscendence ." 7 In the following passage Lonergan further clarifies the meaning of this radical thrust for self-transcendence by distinguishing between transcendental concepts and transcendental notions: . . . intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers are true and whether what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is good and what only apparently is good. So if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending , we form the transcendental concepts of the true and the real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get •MT, pp. 11 and 78. 8 Ibid. • Ibid., p. 11. 0 Ibid., p. 74. 0 Ibid., p. 11. 7 Ibid., p. 105. BERNARD LONERGAN ON VALUE 245 the transcendental concept of value, of the truly good. But quite distinct from such transcendental concepts, which can be misconceived and often are, there are the prior transcendental notions that constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action.8 .According to...