The Concept of Existence and the Structure of Judgment: A Thomistic Paradox

THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENT: A THOMISTIC PARADOX 1JHE PRECISE ROLE of existence as related to judgment has increasingly engaged the attention of Thomisc metaphysicians in recent years.1 The plethora of articles and books whose attention has been bent to the elucidation of the issue might lead us to suspect that little more can be said on the subject. A warning signal that this suspicion is not well founded is the appearance of several studies that have challenged the thesis that the metaphysics of St. Thomas advances towards its fruition thanks to a disengagement of exigencies discovered in the famous "judgment of separation." 2 Even though the thesis has been argued that the interpretations given the Thomistic being (esse) by Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson are by no means equivalent doctrines, the names of these two illustrious philosophers are frequently linked by the opponents of what might well be called a "metaphysics of separation " and what has in fact been referred to as "existential Thomism." 3 The expected reaction against the Existentialism of the post-World War II era has resonated within Thomistic circles as well. The present essay is by no means a contribution to the literature of Thomistic revisionism, pro or con, but is written in the spirit of a man who, in fact a nonrevisionist , is convinced that all has not yet been said about 1 E.g., R. Henle," Existentialism and the Judgment," in Proc. Amer. Cath. Phil. Ass. ~1 (1947), pp. 40-53; H. Renard, " The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment ," New Scholasticism, ~3 (1949), pp. 887-394; S. Mansion, "Philosophical Explanation," Dominican Studies 3 (1950), pp. 197-~19; Joseph Owens, "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies, 3~ (1970); Ambrose McNicholl, " On Judging," THE THOMIST, 88 (1974), pp. 768-8~5. 2 E.g. G. Lindbeck, "Participation and Existence," Franciscan Studies XVII (1958), pp. 107-125. Literature relevant to the issue is marshalled by Lindbeck. s E.g., ibid., passim. 817 318 FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN the role of existence and judgment, that the role of the judgment of separation, of a properly negative dimension to all metaphysical propositions and conclusions, is sufficiently dense and rich that we can assume confidently, unless proven otherwise , that there is more to the doctrine than meets the eye. St. Thomas's teaching that human understanding bifurcates into two terminal operations, expressed by distinct verba of the mind, is so well known that it suffices here merely to restate the doctrine. Two acts grasp two aspects of being which, thanks to subsequent reasoning, are known to be non-identical or "really distinct." The synthesizing, composing, or "togethering " function of the act of existing, an activity which forms no part of any synthesis but which is the catalyst in which the principles of nature are annealed into unity, is reiterated cognitively and hence intentionally by the intellect in the act of judgment.4 Judgment thus is a re-play of the principles of the real. So far as existence is concerned, judgments exercise in a spiritual way the very existential composing which is going on in the real at any one moment of time. The verb " to be " consignifies in the mind the active composing •In I Sent., d. 38, q. l, a. 3, Sol.: "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Unde quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De Anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem conpreh.endit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum. In I Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, Sol.: ''. .. omnis causa habet ordinem principii ad esse sui causati quod per ipsam constituitur; " In I Semt., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "... quod cum esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet divinum esse, et hoc nomen ' qui est ' imperfecte significat ipsum, quia significat per modum cujusdam concretionis et compositionis": In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: " Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent...