Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas

PRAETER INTENTIONEM IN AQUINAS HENRY SIDGWICK MAINTAINED that one must intend the foreseen consequences of acts.1 More recent philosophers have asserted propositions about intention which are in agreement with Sidgwick's view at least to the extent of denying the possibility that the foreseen consequences of one's act can be separated from one's overall intention in acting.2 On such views one cannot distinguish between those foreseen consequences of one's acts which are intended and those which are not intended but "merely consented to " or, as scholastic philosophers and theologians often say, " permitted ." 8 A number of philosophers have taken issue with views of intention having this implication.4 And philosophers sympathetic to the scholastic tradition are likely to share this scepticism.5 The doctrine of the double effect presupposes at least this: that one can direct his intention to the good effect of his action and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not a means 1 Henry Sidgwick, The Metlwds of Ethics (7th ed., New York: 1966), p. 202. •See Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Structure of Intention," The Journal of Phuosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 636-637, and Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Intentions and the Structure of Intention," The Journal, of Phuosophy, 68 (1971) pp. 456-459. • See Chisholm, op. cit., pp. 639-641. •See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (2nd ed., Ithaca: 1963), pp. 41-45, and "Modern Moral Philosophy," in J. J. Thomson and G. Dworkin, eds., Ethics, (New York: 1968), pp. 199-200; J. L. Austin, "Three Ways of Spilling Ink" in Phuosophical Papers, ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (2nd edition, London, Oxford , New York: 1970) pp. 278-279; A. Kenny, "Intention and Purpose, "The Journal of Phuosophy, 63 (1966), pp. 642-651; B. N. Fleming, "On Intention," The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), pp. 307-310. G. Pitcher, "'In Intending' and Side Effects," The Journal of Phuosophy, 67 (1970) pp. 663-668. J. M. Boyle Jr. and T. D. Sullivan, "The Diffusiveness of Intention Principle: A CounterExample ," Philosophical Studies, 31 (1977) pp. 357-360. •See Anscombe's response to Sidgwick in "Modem Moral Philosophy," pp. 199-200. 649 650 JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR. to the former.8 0£ course, this notion of "direction of intention ,, is open to abuses 1 and it has itself been the subject of criticism (and abuse) since the seventeenth century.8 This controversy over one aspect of the nature of intention raises three important questions: 1) Is it possible to distinguish between what the agent intends in acting and what he foresees will follow from his acting but does not intend? ~) If we can make such a distinction, where is it to be drawn? What components of all that comes about by one's acts and decisions are such that they can be outside one's intention? 8) And why should the difference between what one intends and what one foresees but does not intend be important for the definition and moral evaluation of kinds of human acts? This third question requires a long answer; I will set it aside and concentrate on the first two. I propose to begin to answer these questions by considering Aquinas's views on what is intended and what is outside or beside the intention-on what Aquinas calls " praeter intentionem." Such an investigation is a promising starting point for several reasons, among which is the fact that Aquinas is one of the chief architects of the tradition in which the doctrine of direction of intention was developed .9 On what is within the agent'8 intention According to Aquinas intention is an act of the will whose object is the end. But intention is not a simple willing of the end; it is a willing of the end insofar as the end is " the term • See A. Kenny, " The History of Intention in Ethics," The Anatomy of the Soul, (Oxford, New York: 1978) pp. 140-141; J. B. Gury, S. J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Vol. 1 (!rod ed. Rome, Turin: 1869), p. 7. •See G. E. M. Anseombe, "War and Murder," in R. Wasserstrom, ed., War and Morality (Belmont, Calif.: 1970), pp. 50-51...