Kant on the Tutelage of God and Nature

KANT ON THE TUTELAGE OF GOD AND NATURE* Ay ATTEMPT TO discuss the Kantian philosophy in terms of the success or failure of specific doctrines, such as the distinction between phenomena and noumena , is premature unless guided by an understanding of what Kant refers to as its architectonic-the systematic unity of the various modes of knowledge expressing a prephilosophical Idea which serves as the norm for the possibility as well as doctrinal components of philosophy as metaphysics. As stated by Kant: By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason-of the form of a whole-insofar as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold contents, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another.1 Kant's architectonic thus becomes a hermeneutics for judging the doctrinal components of his metaphysics as they issue from its Idea. That this Idea is a priori points to its prephilosophical (i.e., pretheoretical) origin. And the locus of the prephilosophical is the realm of practice. The Kantian Idea thus concerns the ground of human aotion, for the eros toward metaphysics springs from the " ultimate aim of reason," which is " no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy." 2 Kant's metaphysics is thus a metaphysics of morals since man's moral calling -resting on the two pillars of the categorical imperative and practical autonomy-is its a priori beginning. It is in this *For much in this article I am indebted to my former teacher Peter Van Nuis. 1 Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith (New York, 1965), B860. Hereafter designated "CPuR ". This crucial heuristic is reiterated in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason. • CPuR, B868. 26 KANT ON THE TUTELAGE OF GOD AND NATURE 27 light that we must evaluarte Kant's theoretical assertions, the most problematic being the duality of phenomena and noumena . For while it is true that Kant's purely philosophical arguments turn on this distinction, the Kantian architectonic forces us to recognize that this central bifurcation has its ground in turn in a practical and not a theoretical obligationthe categorical imperative as the overriding metaphilosophical norm. This is shown by Kant's analysis of metaphysics as a natural disposition. The possibility of philosophy as metaphysics is expressed in a two-fold manner: a) as a theoretical science and b) as a natural disposition. The former is shown to be impossible since pure reason desires what it cannot achieve-a science of metaphysics on a par with the sciences of physics and mathematics. Consequently the question becomes, as in the Prolegomena, " Is metaphysics possible at all? " since reason encounters antinomies and dialectical illusions when reaching for the Absolute . However, despite constant failure the attempt nonetheless persists. The possibility of metaphysics thus shifts to its possibility as a natural disposition. That is, we do not ask (as with physics and mathematics) how metaphysics as an actual science becomes possible. We ask, given the perpetual frustration, how metaphysics arises as a natural disposition and in wha:t way this disposition is to be properly directed. The answer to both questions is reason's practical employment. The origin and content of metaphysics is man's eithical nature. The metaphysical questions-God, freedom and immortality -are the ethically most significant questions since " these ... in turn refer us yet ful'lther, namely, to the problem of what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world." 3 What we ought to do, of course, is obey the categorical imperative. The primacy of practical over theoretical reason is likewise reflected in the ordering of the questions concerning the three metaphysical issues: 8 Ibid., BS!lS. ~8 WALTER SOFFER 1. What can I know?, which points to absolute first cause. ~. What ought I to do?, which points to freedom as the ground of the moral law. 3. What may I hope?, which points to the transcendental ground...