The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom [Third Installment]

THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREED0.\1 [Third Installment] I. THE SuAREZIAN TEACHING ABOUT HuMAN FREEDOM IV. THE FREE ACTS I. The Nature of" Free Use." 124 We have seen the Suarezian teaching on the nature of liberty, its characteristics, its subject , its relation to divine movement and divine freedom, to created intelligence, and to created necessary acts. We have also seen that freedom to be real requires not only the free faculty but the free use of that faculty as well. With that use we shall now concern ourselves. Suarez indicates that the very use of free will consists in indifference. He appeals to the Council of Trent,125 for the Council, as we have seen, declares liberty is in the power of indifference. The use, therefore, of liberty is the use of that power. If a man is incapable of the use of this power then he lacks the indifferent power. Man, then, is naturally capable of the free use of the free faculty and in the exercise of human actions he retains this use; otherwise all his acts are outside his nature.126 It is certain that there is in us liberty such that in the very instant in which we freely operate, the potency retains its indifference.127 An act in which the power is determined is not free for, Suarez repeats, the act of the will does 12' Cf. Opus. Primum, Liber I, cap. 1-4. 125 Trent, Sess. 6, can. 5 (Denz., n. 815), cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797), and can. 4 (Denz., n. 814). 126 (Si) homo ex natura sua incapax est usus libertatis a nobis expositae . . . sequitur non solum carere hominem usu libero suorum actuum sed etiam carere interna facultate (Opus. Primum, cap. I, nn. 6-7). 127 Sit ergo primum hujus materiae fundamentum certissimum dari in nobis talem libertatem quae in ipso usu humanorum actuum indifferentiam . . . habeat ... quod ipse usus sit cum indifferentia quam retinet potentia etiam in ipso instanti in quo libere operator (Ibid., n. 8). 448 BASIS OF SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM 449 not haYe the note of freedom immediately, but from the faculty which actually exercises freedom in the very act. If either power (of acting or of not acting) is not proximately expedited for act the act is not free.128 The free act of willing can be impeded (though the potency remains free) because: a) God's concursus is not ~;iven; or b) because the object is not proposed . In neither case is the consequent non-act free.129 The free act of not-willing, on the other hand, cannot be impeded by the object (for the object can move the will only insofar as the will is born to be moved by it), but it can be impeded by God, ·whose infinite power can overcome the creature's finite capacity for both willing and not-willing.1 so 2. God's Causality With Regard to Free Acts. Every act depends immediately on God, Who gives being not only to the faculty, but to the operation as well. God acts in our acts, even with immediacy of supposit as well as with immediacy of power. The effect comes forth by one and the same act from God and from the creature; the very act of will is one act flowing immediately and per se not only from us but also from God and this, Suarez adds, is the teaching of St. Thomas.131 God causes this action immediately through His will or power, not through some other action in the creature, for to act another action is given. Through one and the same action God, together with the will, influences the act or the term of action.132 128 Ibid., cap. 2, n. 5. 120 Potest autem ilia facultas quoad potestatem volendi impediri vel ex parte objecti per ignorantiam vel inconsiderationem . . . vel ex parte potentiae si fingamus privari omni concursu (Ibid., n. 10). 130 Quoad potestatem nolendi vel non volendi non potest impediri usus libertatis ex parte objecti ... potest tamen impediri ab aliqua exteriori causa ... quia in voluntate Iibera duplex sit potestas ad volendum scilicet et non volendum neutra eorum et infinitae...