Skeptical Essays by Benson Mates (review)

448 BOOK REVIEWS Skeptical Essays. By BENSON MA.TES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xi + 176. $17.00. " The principal traditional problems of Philosophy are genuine intellectual knots; they are intelligible enough, but at the same time they are absolutely insoluble." So runs the pessimistic thesis of Benson Mates's Skeptical Essays. The outline of his argument is to identify the essential features of " genuine intellectual knots " or paradoxes, select paradigm paradoxes, and demonstrate tha;t they have these features, and then to identify two principal problems of philosophy which share these essential features. A paradox is a seemingly valid argument that has apparently true premises yet an implausible or self-contradictory conclusion. A paradigm paradox is reasonably short, has logical transitions which satisfy standards as high as are imposed on reasoning anywhere else, and it should appear that there are no slippery logical transitions or ' fuzzy ' terms. In short, there must appear to be no way to avoid the conclusion. Mates selects the Liar's and Russell's Paradoxes as paradigms. After clearly stating each, he rehearses their major purported solutions and carefully indicates the inadequacy of each solution. The intention is to demonstrate not only that these paradoxes have the aforementioned characteristics , but also that, although there is unanimous agreement among philosophers that something is wrong, no proffered solution has ever gained more than a minority as adherents. The two problems of philosophy, identified by Mates as intelligible yet insoluble, concern the freedom of the will and our knowledge of the external world. The former is a metaphysical problem of practical significance , the latter is epistemological with questionable practical implications . Mates, following his program, clearly states each problem, presents significant purported solutions, then points out the shortcomings of each solution. He thereby re-establishes the initial problem and demonstrates the existence of the relevant paradoxical characteristics. The second chapter contains, among other more concise theoretical solutions , an extended discussion of Austin's attempt as presented in his "A Plea For Excuses" to solve the Free Will problem. It is his contention that the very statement of the Free Will problem is unintelligible because of the misuse of the critical qualifiers" freely" and "voluntarily"· In a lucid rebuttal, Mates argues that not only are Austin's criteria for the applicability of these qualifiers mistaken, but also that the Free Will problem can be stated without their use. The third chapter moves briskly through the history of philosophy and the various prominent attempts by notable philosophers to solve the problem of Our Knowledge of the External World. By design, though, no BOOK REVIEWS 449 attempt is made to present either a comprehensive or a meticulous set of solutions or rejections of these solutions. The aim is always to establish and perpetuate a sense of philosophic wonder and paradox. In this respect Mates is successful. But granted that Mates establishes his skeptical thesis, there is little suggestion as to what is to be made of the resulting intellectual paralysis. What is the purpose and value of philosophy in the event that the principal philosophic problems are insoluble' Additionally , what other traditional principal problems does Mates have in mind' No answers are given or suggested. Mates is at his best when stating the relevant philosophic problems and providing a 'map' of the historical attempts to solve them. The prose and logic are straightforward, crisp, and lively. One only wishes he had said a little more about what, if anything, comes next. CRAIG KNOCHE 24 Lawton A venue Cliffside Park, New Jersey Emotion. By WILLIAM LYONS. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 230. $29.50. Dr. Lyons concentrates -0n emotional states rather than on emotions considered dispositionally. His argument is that they can be accounted for by ' the causal-evaluative theory ' in terms of which ' X is deemed an emotional state if and only if X is a physiologically abnormal state caused by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her situation' (pp. 57 f). According to Lyons, the physiological changes which go with emotional states can be evidence of an emotion's presence, but they are not necessarily evidence of some particular emotion and " there is...