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:BOOK REVIEWS 309 if one acts on the assumption that it is true, one is more likely to achieve the goals of religion than if one acts on any contrary assumption." Given the distinction between belief-that-p and acting on the assumption-that-p, it is not clear that the two statements of the requirement are equivalent. Secondly, Swinburne sees acting on the assumption-that-p as equal to "do[ing] those actions which you would do if you believed p" (31) and claims that such action implies the belief in the " small probability " that p. Rationally to do those actions, however (to act rationally on the assumption -that-p), it is necessary only that one believe that p is possi"i)le. For those who might require some added psychological impulse, it would be sufficient to couple the belief in the possibility that p with hope that p. My question then is whether Swinburne sees the belief in the " small probability " of p as something stronger than belief that p is possible. My reservations about this volume are, in general, minor ones; it is a classic statement of one side of the current debate concerning the autonomy of religious belief and should be read by anyone interested in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia M. JAMIE FERREIRA Doubt And Religious Commitment: The Role of The Will In Newman's Thought. By M. JAMIE FERREIRA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 156. $9.50. After John Henry Newman's Grammar of Assent appeared in the Spring of 1870, it received a number of critical reviews, but only one which Newman himself thought "understood me," Mozley's analysis in the Quarterly Review, July, 1870. Jamie Ferreira has given us a recent exegesis of the Grammar along lines with which I believe Newman, for the most part, would concur. For years Newman had been struggling with the relationship between belief (as unconditional assent) and evidences, seen in his notebooks, his correspondences (especially with Wm. Froude), and his sermons. In 1866, while vacationing in Switzerland, "the ' Open Sesame' of the whole subject" (Letters, 25 :199) came into view: that certitude following upon logical demonstration was but one type of assent, yet it was still possible for the human mind to assent absolutely on reasons which taken separately are but probabilities. Now does this mean that one wills to assent, as if the evidences are not up to the markT Does it mean that belief, a type of assent for Newman, is an effect of will power alone and that rational justification is ultimately nugatoryT Newman :no BOOK REVIEWS elaborated his Swiss insight in terms of a duty to assent, but what is the role of the will in this process? Ferreira's book wishes to defend Newman against charges that his insight is an intellectual cop-out. The Grammar can be read from different angles, and, while Ferreira's angle differs from my own, I would agree that her defense of Newman is consonant with his basic principles and the subtle logic he employed. She does find certain inconsistencies in Newman's expression which ultimately are not injurious to his position, in her opinion, although I would caution about placing too much exegetical weight on pre-1866 texts. It is on two usages of will, however, not appreciated by most critics of Newman, that Ferreira makes her case. I will first elaborate her argument and then conclude with some of my own readings. Ferreira presents a logical reading of the Grammar, and a reader must be ready for some passages of heightened subtlety. Her dialogue partners are contemporary philosophers of religion, concerned with issues of rational justification, epistemology, and canons of logic. Her strong suit is an awareness of recent literature in the field, and she is able to translate Newman's Victorian parlance into the contemporary discussion. This is the angle from which she works, which I find so laudable. She finds that Newman has anticipated so many of their "findings" in non-analytic ratiocination, i.e., non-logically demonstrable arguments. In terms of content, rather than method, the discussion shapes up as follows: Newman maintains...

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