“The Doctrine of Double Effect”

" THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT" I INTEREST IN THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: WHY BOTHER? RCENT INTEREST AMONGST philosophers in the Doctrine of Double Effect 1 seems extraordinary, given that the Doctrine would appear merely to be an esoteric and derivative aspect of Catholic-and more narrowly , Thomistic-moral theology, embedded in a morality based upon general, exceptionless moral rules. It is not simply that some prominent moral philosophers have chosen to widen the range of discussion of possible views on basic moral issues, and in particular that of the morality of killing, by including for interest's sake a discussion of the Doctrine. Rather, an examination of the viability and importance of the Doctrine's central distinction between what a person ' foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict sense, he intends' 2, now appears to be regarded as essential to any satisfactory discussion of the general issue of killing, and of its particular aspects (abortion, euthanasia, warfare, and so on) .3 This development is surprising because within its Thomistic context the Doctrine is made necessary by the acceptance of 1 Sometimes called the Principle of Double Effect, or the Doctrine or Principle of Twofold Effect. 2 Philippa Foot, 'Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect' (in James Rachels (Ed.), Moral Problems, New York: Harper and Row, 1975, 2nd edition 59-70), p. 60. a See, e.g. James Rachels (Ed.), op. oit.; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1977) ; Richard Wasserstrom (Ed.), War and Morality, (Wadsworth, 1970). 188 THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 189 two tenets, the range and combination of which not many moral philosophers now would regard as tenable. These tenets are: (1) Some intentional actions are intrinsically morally wrong, and (2) It is never morally permissible to use an intrinsically bad means to a good end.4 . G. E. M. Anscombe lists those actions which Catholic moral theory forbids, ' whatever consequences threaten', as ' choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment; treachery . . .; idolatry; sodomy; adultery; [and] making a false profession of faith '.5 Further, although treachery and making a false profession of faith may be seen as species of lying, both Augustine and Aquinas regarded all lies, however harmless or well-motivated, as sins. Needless to say, various methods were devised to dull the sting of this general prohibition in obvious problem cases.6 Nevertheless, lying could never be morally justified on this view. Undoubtedly, mu~h of the interest in this strict stance is motivated by concern for what many would regard as its morally abhorrent conclusions. Interestingly, such criticisms cast the rulings of Catholic moral theory as either far too restrictive, or far too permissive. Where restrictive, that Catholic moral teaching disallows the intentional killing of one innocent person -even in extreme cases where this is the sole means of saving thousands of lives-is regarded as almost sufficient illustration of its unacceptability.7 On the other hand, it is held that far too much foreseen, unintended killing could be 4 Given that this second tenet is often explicitly stated, the acceptance of these exceptionless moral rules is not, as H. J. McCloskey suggests, the result of confusing the intrinsically wrong with the absolutely wrong. (H. ,T. McCloskey, Meta-Ethics and N ormatives Ethics, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 213.) 5 G. E. M. Anscombe, ' Modern Moral Philosophy' (in Thomson and Dworkin (Ed.), Ethics, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 186-210), p. 198. a For a discussion of the history of the prohibition against lying in Catholic moral theology, see Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Priv'Jte Life (The Harvester Press, 1978), Ch. III. 7 See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 215-216. 190 SUZANNE M. UNIACKE justified on the Catholic view-that it would allow, for example , obliteration bombing. These criticisms are not incompatible. To believe that there may be circumstances in which it would be right directly to intend the death of an innocent person is not thereby to be committed to the view that foreseen extensive killing is morally permissible. But whilst Catholic moral theory is committed to (what many regard as...